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PREFACE 
Historians have recently given increased consideration to the 
life of Caius Marius. Heretofore he was recognized as a military 
leader and statesman of Rome during the second and first centuries, 
BoC., but little was really known of the man himselfo His military 
ability has long been recognized by historians and his contributions to 
the development of the Roman anny have often been recounted. His 
activities :in the political field are less auspicious and, hence, more 
obscure. Recent findings reveal Marius as an investor and financier 
of high standing in Rome. He is currently being shown as having had 
far more inUuence in the economic life of Rome than was previously 
suspected. 
The sum of his attributes and accomplishments give cause to 
question why such an important Rom~ public figure could be forced to 
exile himself from Rome. The question is heightened in view of Marius' 
almost unprecedented position in the city at the end of the Ciwbric 
Wars. The pop'Ulace and his veterans went so far as to compare Marius 
to the god Dionysus, and to declare him "The Third Founder of Rome" 
after Romulus and Camillus. Yet, Marius deliberately chose exile in 
preference to the scorn of his fellow-citizens in 99 B.C., after the 
actions of his political agents had outraged the Romans of economic 
and social consequence. 
This thesis examines the factors leading to Caius Marius' fall 
from power and prestige in the Republic. It evaluates the cause and 
iii 
effect of factors which contributed to the collapse of Marius' public 
career and determines the primary cause for his failure in political 
life. 
Marius grew to maturity in an environment of factional politics, 
hence this Roman phenomenon is defined and Marius' place established in 
it. Marius rose to prominence in Rome by way of his military ability 
so his military career is recounted, his contributions to the re-
organization of the Roman military system are evaluated, and his 
triumph after the Cimbric War is established. Marius fell from power 
because of his political ineptitude, therefore his political life is 
traced, his political philosophy is evaluated, and his failure in 
politics is substantiated. 
Caius Marius' fall from power must be attributed to political 
ineptitude, for he was almost without peer in military leadershipo 
Opposite to his military career, Marius revealed an incompetence in 
the field of public affairs. He did not seem to understand the 
senatorial factional system, nor was he aware of its power and 
necessity to the administration of the state. He tended to act as 
if there were two well defined political parties, the optimates and 
populares, yet the factions alone had any measurable dimension in 
the Roman politics of this day. Marius' penchant for vacillation in 
his political life, his failure to reconcile himself with the sena-
torial nobles, and his reluctance to be as decisive in his political 
life as he was in his military career must be regarded as the primary 
causes for his failure and his exile. 
Few human accomplishments are the result of any single person's 
effort, instead, his work is more often than not only the part of a 
iv 
greater whole. Such is true of this work. It could never have reached 
this point without the invaluable assistance and welcome patience of 
Dr. Neil J. Hackett who encouraged and guided my efforts. Without the 
urging of John T. Stevens, who pointed me toward graduate work in 
history, this work would never have started. Finally, to Marjorie 
who cheerfully accepted the task as breadwinner while her husband 
pursued this goal. Without her this could never have happened at alle 
v 
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CHAPTER I 
THE BACKGROUND 
The misuse of personal power which resides in dominant political 
personalities and which originates from military, political, or social 
popularity has plagued mankind and his institutions from society's 
inception. No tribe, city-state, nation, or empire has been immune to 
the influence of this personally directed power in its leaders. No 
political institution has escaped the influen~e from power centered in 
the person of politically inclined aspirants for positions of control. 
No society has failed somewhere in its history to be aJ..tered by those 
who express their pers6tteJ. power for purposes of self-interest. 
The Roman Republic and its institutions were no exception. The 
trace of Roman history was a continu;um of social, cultural, and 
political forces at work through the medium of various factions by 
which power was wielded in varying degrees to cause ~ desired modifi-
cation of Roman institutions. Indicative of this trend was the abrupt 
change from a monarchial system to that of a republican form under the 
influence of the patrician class. Later, the Republic was modified 
from aristocratic control to a quasi-democracy in which the middle 
and lower classes exercised their power in the guise of "democratic" 
leaders. Finally, the Republic fell and an empire was established 
when the republican form could no longer withstand the hammering of 
itfi opponents. 
l 
This thesis directs its primary attention to a short but 
critical phase in the history of the Roman Republic during which some 
of the foundations of the later empire were laid by those who strug-
gled as the champions of the populares viz ~ viz the optimates. Its 
.focus is Caius Marius, a Roman military genius and savior of his 
2 
country, who, nonetheless, failed to use his military power and social 
popularity to cement the stones of the crumbling facade of Roman 
republicanism. Instead, his efforts in military, social, and political 
activity actually created an environment in which the forces of 
1 
reaction and imperial design found their roots. 
Marius, the soaring eagle when in military command, soon reverted 
to a flighty sparrow when faced with the enigmas of social and politi-
cal control in the Republic. Strong and confident in battle, Marius 
became indecisive and querulous in the role of a Roman politiciano 2 
In the short span of almost three years from his thrilling victory in 
the Cimbric Wars during 101 B.C. to his shameful, self-imposed exile 
1Theodor Mommsen, ~ History of Rome, Vol. III (New York, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1905), p. 462, makes a strong point of Caius Marius' 
justification for granting enfranchisement en masse to two cohortes 
of Italian allies in saying ". • • he justified himself afterwards by 
saying that amidst the noise of battle he had not been able to dis-
tinguish the voice of the laws." Mommsen follows Marius' extenuation 
with his own opinion that ". • • the new eagle which Caius Marius be-
stowed on the legions proclaimed the near advent of the emperors."; 
Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1949y;-p. 17. 
~lutarch, Marius in Plutarch's Lives, translated by Bernadotte 
Perrin (~ Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 
XXVIII, 1-3, compares Marius' action in awarding citizenship to the 
Italian allies, regardless of the law in that matter, and his con-
fusion when trying to address the popular assemblies as his basis for 
saying Marius' ambition "made him most timorous." 
3 
in 99 B.C. ,3 Marius fell from the heights of exaultation as the "third 
founder" of Rome4 to the depths of a reviled exile who saw his only 
chance for vindication in war -- one he would promote with Mithridates 
of Pontus by his own machinations and at Rome's expense, if need be. 5 
The events of this short span in Roman history reveal with 
startling clarity Marius' incompetence as a politician, a shortcoming 
which would lead to his fall from power. One must look to the 
political arena for Marius' weaknesses, for none in Rome of his day 
could equal his military ;I..eadership. 6 Emerging from the Cimbric Wars 
as one of the greatest heroes Rome had produced to that time, Marius 
soon revealed himself as a reluctant politician, a stammering and in-
effective public S:f>eaker, and worst of all, a man of strong animosi-
ties but one with no particular party or ideals. 7 Marius would have 
escaped from the pressure of politics after the Cimbric Wars, had he 
been able to do so. Unfortunately, the press of promises made earlier 
to his veterans denied him the relief of retiring from public affairs 
3The time period dealt with covers Rome from Marius' birth, c. 
155 B.C;., until his exile after the return of Metellus Numidicus to 
Rome in 99 B.C. All dates hereafter are B.C. unless specifically 
noted otherwise. 
4P1utarch, Marius, XX.VII, 2-3; Stewart Perowne, Death 2f the 
Roman Republic (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968), P• 89. 
5Plutarch, Marius, XXXI, 2-3. 
6H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero (London: University 
Paperbacks, 1966), P• W.- - - -
7Plutarch, Marius, .xxvIII, 3; XXIX, 3. 
in the cloak of a hero with the public's adulation.~ 
Marius' disgrace and subsequent exile has its roots firmly 
planted in his di splq of politicaJ. incompetence,9 his inability to 
select honest and loyal political agents,10 his lack of rapport and 
11 
communication with the populace on whose support he was dependent, 
his failure to retain the continuing support of the eguites,12 and 
perhaps most importantly, in his inability to establish a working 
alliance with the senatorial factions of Rome.13 Marius rose to 
greater heights than any of his predecessors by his military genius, 
his strong feel for command, his leadership of Rome and its legions 
in time of stress, and his sense of the military necessities pre-
requisite to the physical security of the Republic. Yet, Marius lost 
everything when he was no longer the focus of Rome's strength and 
found himself instead subject to the vagaries of a populace whose 
support was vital to his political program. 
BFritz M. Heichelheim and Cedric A. Yeo, A. History 2.f the Roman 
People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), 
PP• 190-192; Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. III, P• 456, indicates 
the press of admirers kept Marius in the public office. He says 
"the work of Marius seemed to his admirers by no means finishede o •" 
and further, "his military and political position was such that, 
if he would not break with the glorious past;,, if he would not deceive 
the expectations of his party and in ract the nation, • o o he must 
check the maladministration of public affairs and put an end to the 
goverrunent of the restoration • • • " 
9Plutarch, Marius, IX, 1. 
10 Plutarch, Marius, XIV, 7-B. 
11P1utarch, Marius, XX.VIII, 1-3. 
12F1utarch, Marius, xxx., 3. 
13Plutarch, Marius, x, l; :xxx:, 1-4; :xxx:r' 1. 
4 
5 
Marius entered Roman political life with his election to the 
tribunate in 119. Rome at this time was governed by the "restored" 
oligarchy which returned to power with the demise of the Gracchii and 
the temporary cessation of the populare ascendency over the senatorial 
control of Rome. The Senate was once again the primary device of 
administration for the Republic, but with the significant difference 
that factions within the senatorial party were the controling factor, 
not the senatorial concensus. Marius found himself confronted in the 
political arena with the recurrent friction of the populares against 
the optimates on one side, and the powerful forces of the senatorial 
factions on the other~ For the rest of his political life, Marius 
was a focal point of the conflict between the populists and the 
nobility and the target for the frustrations of the factions within 
the Senate, w~o resented Mariu~' rise to power. 
Marius' failure to understand the nature of the senatorial 
factions, his inability to reconcile himself with them once he had 
alienated them, and his vacillating program toward these senatorial 
factions were the primary causes for his political debacle in 99 B~C. 
CHAPTER II 
ROMAN FACTIONAL POLITICS 
Rome grew from a tribal conununity to a monarchial city-state 
on the banks of the Tiber River. It nourished under the benign 
conditions of its environment so strongly that Rome would eclipse even 
Carthage as it prospered. Though not untouched by what had previously 
happened in Mediterranean civilization, Rome was destined to create 
new political forms for society. It would conquer the world and give 
it a fundamental belief in law and orderly government. This heritage 
did not occur without internal upheaval and social paroxysm; these 
Rome suffered frequently, at l~ast until the advent of empire stabi-
lized its political activity. 
The aristocrats who overthrew the monarchy to fonn an oligarchic 
republic seem to have had three basic purposes in mind. First, they 
wished to eradicate the hated monarchy without weakening the executive 
power or the state; ;rie#~t)t-&.l~~~ .. ,~,,!e.!fe:q~~-tm.Jpart.1.:Cipa<!it6.!!i of 
. . . ?·. 
·~e·~·e:t~jryi.in W1:'.k~~~Jt»mtd'"~lly, te {lm.sure the filtimate 
1 power of the state should rest in a council or elders. Significantly, 
these aristocrats also created in the minds 0f the Romans a hatred for 
1John Dickenson, Death 2! !. Republic (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1963), P• 5. 
monarchy or any aspect of regnum. 2 This attitude permeated the 
political life of the Republic until its fall, caused by thoi:ie who 
preferred empire to the chaos of factional politics.3 
The Senate began and remained throughout the Republic the most 
vital mechanism in Roman politics. Formed by selection on a life 
basis by the consuls from the original aristocrats, the Senate could 
convene only at the call of the highest magistrates. Fairly early in 
the Republic the plebeians were able to secure recognition of their 
political presence in Rome. However, this was done more through 
their own assemblies than in the Senate. Nonetheless, by the advent 
7 
of the Punic Wars the plebs had gained the right to stand for election 
to various magistracies. 
Sallust recogni~es the peace which followed the P'Uilic Wars as the 
dividing line between the·moderation in government which preceded the 
wars, and a wantonness and arrogance in public affairs fostered by the 
prosperity of the wartime a~terrnath. 4 As the Senate was drawn by 
this time from holders of the principal magistracies, significant 
numbers of weal.thier plebs began to appear in the halls of the Senate 
- and more wished to do so,5 
In theory the Senate was not a legislative body; its function was 
2wallace E. Caldwell, The Ancient World (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston), P• 344. 
31ily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in~ A'e ,2! Caesar 
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1949 , PP• 22-23. 
4sallust, The ID!!: With Jugurtha, translated by J. C. Rolfe 
(~ Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1965), XLI, 
1-3. 
5cyTil E, Robinson, ! History of the Roman Republic (New York: 
Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1932), PP• 46-47. 
8 
advisory in nature only. Yet, in actual practice, it was the dominant 
political power in Rome after the Punic Wars. 6 It could draft legis-
lation for submission to one of the assemblies. Its veto of laws 
passed contrary to accepted procedures was a source of power, as was 
its right to interpret laws or to present decrees (valid only if not 
vetoed by a tribune)• Its strongest power rested in the control of 
appropriations and external diplomacy. Extremely important to the 
Senate was its authority under emergency to appoint "dictators" and to 
pass the senatus consultum ultimum. The latter was a "final decree" or 
resolution which declared the state to be in danger and charged all 
officials "to see to it that the Republic take no harmo 117 It was this 
device which provided the Senate with final power over an official 
but its nature required it to be used only sparingly and with cautious 
deliberation. 8 
The founders of the Roman Republic created an admirable form of 
government. From its inception it had the capability to correct 
abuses of power through constitutional means. This capability could 
be exercised through action of the magistrates, by the prestige of the 
Senate, or by the expressed will of the people, But the founders of 
the R.epublic did more than this. In a fervent desire to deny any 
possible return to monarchy they fostered an inimical and lasting fear 
of regnum, and thus a continuing desire for liberty as well, in the 
6 Sallust, Jugurtha, XLI, 6. 
7nickenson, Death of _g, Republic, p. 12. 
8Plutarch, Marius in Plutarch's Lives, translated by Bernadotte 
Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Masso, 1968), 
x:xx, 2-4. 
9 
minds of the people.9 Now that the royal power had passed to the 
consults, the people found a new target for the arrows of political 
discontent. The frustrations of the people resulted in overt conflict 
with the patrician class for the right to enter the magistracies, even 
to the consular level, if possible. 
The demand by the plebeians for political recognition resulted 
in the later creation of pressure from the masses which resembled the 
nature of a political party, hence the tendency to look at the 
populares (those who espoused the cause of the "people") in the neat 
mirror of modern political structure. The opposition, the optimates, 
who were the "best" of Roman aristocracy, is often similarly regarded. 
The friction between these two political groupings resulted in in-
exorable pressures before which the optimates were forced to bend. 
Power, as always, tended to ret-u.rn to the greatest number. Thus the 
aristocracy was coerced by the people to compromise with the fonn of 
a popular state. This period of constitutional modification was the 
cauldron in which the witches brew of factional politics of the 
Republic was boiled. lO It occurred roughly from the codification of 
the Twelve Tables, c. 450, to the Hortensian Law of 2Ff7 which ended 
the struggle of the orders by making tributa legislation ~ .iure 
9Montesquieu, Consideration 2!! ~ Causes of ~ Greatness of the 
Romans .!!!!! Their Decline, translated by David Lowenthal (New York: 
The Free Press, 1965), P• 83. 
10Frank Frost Abbott, A History a,nd Description of Roman Political 
Institutions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1911), 
PP• 49-54, indicates the patrician element in the Senate, not the 
Senate itself, lost power and prestige at this time. He sees the 
Hortensian law "robbing the patricians of the last exclusive political 
power of any importance" but he also indicates the mantle of the 
patricians fell on the shoulders of the novus nobilitas, not the 
"democracy'' or the populares. 
10 
without senatorial approval. 
The substance of the govenunent in this period was an elaborate 
system of checks and balances which depended primarily on the existence 
of veto powers and collegiality of officials. These highly polished 
restraints and balances served to maintain the heal th of the state for 
some time into the second century. By this time the magistracies were 
open to all and the assemblies both elected magistrates and processed 
legislation. Theory and practice are often not the best of running 
mates. Hence, in practice, the administration of the state had be-
come the lot of the Senate by mid-second century. Magistrates were 
usually drawn from the senatorial class and returned to the Senate at 
the end of their tenn. The tribunate now led to the Senate via the 
cursus honorum, thus the tribunes tended to defer to the Senate for 
their own well-being. In the same sense, the Senate respected the 
tribune's close connection with the power of the comitia tributa. An 
inherent weakness in the Senate was its inability, because it was only 
advisory, to control the actions·of the officials and the assemblies 
by constitutional methods. Still, the Senate, not the assemblies 
ruled Rome -- an oligarchy that governed in the name of the people.11 
A new wind began to blow across the political sea after the ex-
hausting wars of the third and second centuries. The stalwart soldier-
farmer was generally the greatest casualty of these wars. The small 
landowner and entrepreneur suffered from the distorted economic flows 
in commerce, the mores maiorum (old ways) crumbled before sensual and 
mercenary relationships, the ancient verities dimmed through diffusion 
11:oickinson, Death 2! !. Republic, P• 14. 
11 
/. in a polygot society in the melaqge that now was Rome, and new ele-
ments ~ aggressive seekers of political power for personal aggrandize-
ment entered into public life in Rome.12 
There were increasing signs of grave consequence fo.r the govern-
ment. The populace displayed indications of growing discontent with 
senatorial government. They resented the oligarchic nature of the 
Senate which had now degenerated into groups aligned in accordance to 
the ranking of public offices held by each group. Consular families 
naturally held the focus of influence by virtue of the prestige and 
wealth they had accumulated. These groupings often combined with 
lesser cliques to gain a balance of power in the Senateo Though 
these factions contained plebeian elements, their natures were essen-
tially patrician and normally conservative in outlook. Outsiders were 
excluded and the groups jealously guarded their perogative and mono-
polistic power which now tended to be less responsive to new interests 
and problems demanding the attention of the government.13 
Economic changes incidental to long periods of very successful. 
warfare seriously disrupted the traditional balance of Roman life. 
The booty of war and the spoils of conquered provinces swelled the 
coffers of noble and middle level families alike. Generals and pro-
vincial governors grew wealthy from the spoils of conquest but the 
long suffering citizen-soldier lost his shirt and his farm. Property 
was consolidated in the hands of the wealthy and the freeman of old 
became a tenant, or worse, a slave on the latifundia. Manumitted 
12 Stewart Perowne, Death of ~ Roman Republic (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1968), PP• 54-55. 
l3Dickinson, Death of ~Republic, P• 15. 
12 
slaves, unemployed, and alien poor rubbed elbows in Rome and trans-
mitted their frustrations to each other. Foreigners flooded into Rome 
bringing diverse cultural mores which chafed at the bonds of the mores 
maiorum. 
The Roman's instinct for order and regularity, his sensible re-
spect for the established patterns of conduct, and his innate modera-
tion were eroded to reveal a base metal uncommon to the mold of his 
ancestors. The tone and organization of Roman society had divided the 
state into selfish groups -- the senators nervously worried about their 
dignitas and auctoritas; the eguites sought even more wealth than they 
had already amassed as publicani for the Senate; and the proletarii 
demanded subsidies, entertainment, and any form of excitement the state 
could provide. 
The stage was set for one hundred years of revolution which had 
its inception in the·office of tribune of the people, as it was 
~xercised by aggressive, self centered political opportunists and 
sincere servants of the people alike. Neither the optimates nor the 
populares can be reg~rded as irresistible forces or immovable objects. 
Each had the capability for compromise if they had so chosen, yet the 
collision of the tribunes with the senatorial factions rocked Rome to 
its very foundations. 14 Sallust views this period as one of contest 
between two parties, between whom the "state was torn to pieceso" He 
charged the nobles with abusing their position and the people of the 
same charge regarding their liberty, thus: 
••• by the side of power, greed arose, unlimited and 
unrestrained, violated and devastated everything, respected 
14.rbid., P• 17. 
nothing, and held nothing sacred, until it finally brought 
about its own downfall. For as soon as nobles were found 
who preferred true glory to unjust power, the state began 
to be disturbed and civil dissension to arise like an 
upheaval of the earth.15 
The intensity of the struggle between the orders of the Roman 
13 
Republic, i.e., the optimates versus the populares, was exacerbated by 
an even more fierce yet far more subtle conflict raging within the 
midst of the aristocracy itself. One finds the term "factional poli-
tics" used to describe the strife which rent the Senate into groups 
of various followers of different Roman political trends. This phe-
nomenon of Roman politics seems to have developed almost as much from 
the nature of the Roman himself than to have any close relationship 
with the normal development of the constitutional form of the Republic. 
Whereas the growth of the Republic was hammered out at the forge of 
class struggle, factions have their roots deeply imbedded in the mores 
maiorum of the Roman past. These values were modified by the collective 
thirst of the optimates for power and the self-aggrandizement it 
brings. 
The Roman was born to the ways of the farmer-soldier who knew from 
his inception twin responsibilities -- duty to the state and duty to 
his family. He was steeped in the thought that with the sound of the 
signal he must rise instinctively to the defense of the state; he 
knew with equal instinct he owed his family the same debts of loyalty 
c;m.d protection.16 This concept is seen in the idea of familia, ex-
pressed so vividly in the aspects of the pater familias who was both 
l5Sallust, Jugurtha, XLI, 6. 
16R. H. Barrow, The Romans (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), 
Po 19. 
14 
tyrant and protector to his brood. Significantly, the responsibilities 
of the pater included the protection of the slaves and. freeworkers on 
the family estates. Here was the first glimmer of the concept of 
clientela which would ultimately become the cornerstone of aristo-
cratic patronage. 
Clientela maybe defined as the relationship of an inferior 
entrusted by custom or by himself to the protection, of a stranger more 
powerful than himself.17 The relationship demanded certain services 
and observances in return for the protection of the patronus. Manu-
mission, the awarding of freedom to one under the power of a stronger 
person, was the most common and historically persistent means by which 
the condition of clientela was fashioned.18 Since the pater familias 
held such power in his social relationship over more unfortunate per-
sons, it is reasonable the concept of clientela derives in great part 
from the freeing of slaves and the subsequent relationship of the 
freedman with his patron. 
An understanding of the social values of the early Roman in his 
relationship with others engendered a sense of validity to the design 
which clientela would take in the last century of the Republic. The 
Roman virtues have their foundation in religio which had a sense of 
binding a man to something external and to which he admitted sub-
ordination.19 This feeling is best summarized by the virtue of pietas 
which required the Roman to concede the rights of the gods; acknowledge 
l7E. Bad:ian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1958), P• 1. . 
18Ibid. , p. 2. 
l9Barrow, The Romans, P• 22G 
15 
the claims of family, state, friends, and benefactors on him; to dis-
charge his duties to them accordingly; and to realize that all these 
claims existed because they were sacred. The demands of pietas, 
dutiful perfonnance of one's obligations, and officium, duty and ser-
vices, constituted in themselves a code of conduct. This code was 
beyond the law, yet it often rendered recourse to the law unnecessaryo 
The addition of certain key virtues to this basic code makes it 
easier to understand the demanding relationship of the patron to his 
client, or patrocinium. Consideration of such revered virtues as 
gravitas, the sense of importance of the matter at hand, firmitas, the 
idea of tenacity in responsibility, constantia, a firmness of purpose; 
all tempered by the concepts of disciplina which provides steadiness 
of character and clementia or the willingness to forgo one's rights, 
provide the basis for understanding that to the early Roman "a 
bargain made was a bargain kept. 1120 Understanding that it is histori-
cally normal for the purity of a virgin faith or belief to be tempe~ed 
over the course of time by the influences of individualism, material-
ism, and cupidity, thus rendering that faith a device to serve one's 
own interests, makes it reasonable to suggest that the relationship of 
patrocinium should suffer the same fate. It is in the context of 
service to self or personal cause that the once noble patron-client 
relationship degenerated and fonned the mortar by which Roman 
factional politics was cemented to the facade of the Roman Republic 
20Ib"d 
]. . ' PP• 20-23. 
16 
in its last century.21. 
Du.ring the last century of the Republic patrocinium came to 
denote the power derived from various relationships. To the relation-
ship of patrocinium was..~added the tie between the one who pleads in 
I . 
a court of law and his client. For example, Caius Herennius was 
brought as a witness against Caius Marius in the trial concerning 
Marius' allege.d bribery in the elections of u5. Herennius pleaded a 
relationship of lawyer-client, which automatically exempted him from 
testifying since such testimony would be a breach of his patrociniumo 22 
Distinguished Romans who conquered provinces, or governed them, 
added these areas and their population to their patrocinium. The war 
with Jugurtha had its roots in the patrocinium under which Masinissa 
of Numidia attached himself to the house of the Cornelii Scipiones 
until he died, making Scipio Aemilianus the executor of his estate. 23 
Jugurtha thus offended Roman honor when he defied the will of 
Masinissa. The powerful Roman held a claim on municipia he founded 
or protected, colonies he may have established, the individuals 
within these entities, or on persons of lower social or political 
21Dickinson, Death 2f !. Republic, p. 23; Sallust, Jugurtha, 
n.I, 1-10, refers to the breakdown in the government of Rome during 
the period from the conclusion of the Punic Wars to the advent of 
Tiberius Gracchus. He says "thus, by the side of power, greed arose, 
unlimited and unrestrained, violated and devastated everything, 
respected nothing, and held nothing sacred, until it finally brought 
about its own downfal,l." 
22plutarch, Marius, V, 4-5. 
23Badian, Clientelae, p, 164, (citing Valerius Maxi.mus, II, 4.) 
comments on Masinissa's attachment to the Scipiones and his advisory 
to his heirs to follow his example. Once this relationship was · 
established the house of Masinissa and Numidia were given the pro-
tection of the Scipiones and from them that of the state. 
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position he may simply have befriendedo 2.J+ The passage of time may 
leave only relics of these bonds but the memory often served more 
realistically as an indication of the relationship than did the 
original ties of reality. 
As Rome grew so did the concept of patronageo To those concepts 
already discussed, the ideas of amicitia was added. In this matter, 
the friendship of disparate parties assumed the relationship of 
clientela~ 25 The depth of this relationship is revealed by Plutarch 
in his passage about the hereditary "guest~friend" of Metellus, one 
Turpillius, who served as chief of engineers for that noble. Placed 
in charge of the city of Vaga, he allowed it to be captured from him 
and was brought to trial for treachery at the insistence of Caius 
Marius. Metellus strongly supported Turpillus and only reluctantly, 
after extreme pressure had been brought to bear, did he pass the 
sentence of death. Significantly, the Metelli's friendship for 
Turpillius made him a client, but now the reverse happened. for Caius 
Marius. The hatred of Metellus, because of this affair, was borne by 
26 Marius to the end of his career. 
A Roman's political career usually began with his joining an 
older politician to take advantage of the elder' s vast lmowledge 
of public affairs. Thus, it was inevitable that this sort of 
arrangement would translate the ethics of friendship to the pragmatic 
~atthias Gelzer, ~ ~ Nobility, translated by Robin Seager 
(Oxford: Wm. Clowes and Sons, 1969), p. 62. 
25Badian, Clientelae, P• 13. 
26P1utarch, Marius, VIII, 2-3. 
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values of politics. 27 Associated closely with the concept of amicitia 
was the process of ho$pitium which demanded the offerer of hospitality 
to be credited with· the loyalty of the recipient. An indication of the 
esteem the Roman held for the val.ue of friendship and hospitality may 
be drawn from Cicero in his orations against Verres in which Cicero 
says· "God help me, I will not say that you were bound to him by 
friendship, which is the most glorious thing in the world, nor by 
hospitality, which is the most sacred ••• n 28 
In general, clientela presupposes the offering of a beneficium 
(loosely a benefit) in return for the recipient's officium (duty and 
services) as requisite to the establishment of a moral basis for the 
relationship. Further, the idea of clientela as the basis for patron-
age, places the patronus in the position where his potestas (power) 
may be drawn solely from the concept of his patrocinium as the relation-
ships multiply and fructify within themselves. The present day con-
cept of "political patronage" shows some resemblance to this Roman 
device and bears out the relationship suggested above. Carried one 
step further, there need only be several such patrocinia at work 
within the political structure of the Roman Senate to result in the 
fractioning of that body into factions at odds with each other. 
Knowing that these factions vied with each other for influence in the 
state, or joined occasionally for mutual benefit, makes the idea of 
factional politics an understandable cause for the nature of the Roman 
27 Gelzer, Roman Nobility, P• 104. 
28cicero, The Verrine Orations, translated by L.H.G. Greenwood 
(Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1946), II, ii, 
XLV, 110-Ul. . 
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Senate after the Punic Wars, 
The fluidity of the factional concept maybe grasped from Plu-
tarch's ~Q.!Marius where he describes Metellus' interdiction from 
fire, water, and shelter for his refusal to swear the oath to support 
Saturninus' legislation. Here Plutarch tells us "The best citizens, 
however, sympathised with Metellus and crowded hastily about him, 
but he would not allow a faction to be raised on his account, and de-
parted from the city, following the dictates of prudenceo 1129 
There was potential danger to the patronus in building his power 
on the basis of patrocinium. Friends do not always remain friends and 
the very strong patronus found inimici (enemies) were acquired as 
easily as amici. A further danger existed in the simple appearance of 
growing power. The Roman feared the tyranny of regnum almost inherent-
ly, a heritage from the days of the overthrow of the monarchy by the 
aristocrats •. Thus, the patron faced the possibility of gaining 
~nemies by an ill-conceived personal action, as well as the potential 
of a sundered faction if it appeared he was acquiring too much power. 
The Scipios, according to Badian, were the outstanding example of a 
case in which invidia led to the fracturing of an extremely strong 
faction. The Scipios "surpassed all in tactlessness, adopting 
cognomina (distinguishing family names) from the whole of the orb is 
(circle) they had conquered." The Scipios fell - a warning to others 
who had strong ambition. 30 
The greatest potential weakness of the Senate was a lack of 
29Plutarch, Marius, XXIX, Bo 
30Badian, Clientelae, PP• 166-167. 
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positive control over the actions of Roman magistrates. Its authority 
was based more on respect accrued over time than from any legal re-
straint on the elected authorities, Its constitutional position was 
advisory and its advice could be ignored. Yet, the Senate by the 
middle of "the second century had, for all practical purposes, gained 
the control in the administration of Roman affairs. Sallust says of 
thif! period that "Affairs at home and in the field were managed 
according to the will of a few men, in whose hands were the treasury, 
the provinces, public offices, glory and triumphs. 1131 
Senatorial control was accomplished mostly through its factions 
which exercised patrocinium over many magistrates, even to the level of 
the peoples' tribunes. Nonetheless, the situation was tenuous since 
opposition to the existing system could quickly disrupt this intricate 
machine. The consuls could take a course of their own design or the 
tribunes could fail to speak for the Senate by their audacious use of 
the veto and the assembly concensus.32 
By the middle of the second century there were signs of increas-
ing discontent in Rome and displeasure with its senatorial government. 
This stemmed from many factors. The rise of the senatorial oligarchy 
above the plebeian and aristocratic representatives, the division of 
this oligarchy into factions, and the exclusion of outsiders from 
these factions were significant. Also, the startling growth of wealth 
which demanded commensurate political strength, and the rise of a 
landholding class which exploited slave labor to work the latifundia 
31sallust, Jugurtha, XLI, 7. 
32Dickinson, Death 2£. !. Republic, PP• 13-15. 
given in the ~ publicus by a partial Senate, created the ~ 
homines who sought political power. The heavy influx of aliens trom 
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the aftermath of war, the creation of a landless class which lost out 
to the economics of high taxes and cheap corn, and the disappearance 
of the fanner-soldier from the century rolls did much to swell the 
already burgeoning proletarii and the P?Pulare classes. 33 
These changes inevitably produced a new atmosphere which had to 
exert a strong inf1.uence on politics. The instinctive Roman passion 
for order and regulation, for the established patterns of the mores 
maiorum, disappeared with the demise of the strongly motivated yeoman 
ot the old Republic. This changed atmosphere bred an unstable mob in 
Rome, generally lowered the respect of Romans for the Senate and 
public order; but, worst of all, it gave rise to the use of the tribu-
nate and demagoguery by those who could exite the mob to irresponsible 
political activity •. The pressure from these forces resulted in ever 
increasing exclusiveness of the senatorial order, which instinctively 
looked to its own self-preservation. The consequence of this was that 
the Senate failed to see the emerging power of the e@ites looming on 
the political horizon. The snobbishness of the Senate served to merge 
the new forces, eguites and proles, into an unreasoning opposition. 
It also made the wealthy plebeians willing to support demagogic action 
to suit their own purposes.34 
These conditions provided the environment in which the hundred 
years of civil strife from the Gracchi to Caesar could develop from 
33sallust, Jugurtha, XXXIX-XLII. 
34nickinson, Death of.!!. Republic, PP• 14-17. 
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germ to full blown epidemic. This period, particularly the Gracchan 
decades prior to Caius Marius entry into politics, shows the polariza-
tion of Rome into two opposing political philosophies. On one hand 
the populist forces saw social legislation under popular control as 
the Republic's course. Equally firmly, the nobles believed the salva-
tiOn of t:Qe state rested in the experienced, conservative hands of the 
Senate. Neither group sensed their unyielding and inflexible positions 
actually sounded the death knell of the Republic, if ever so faintly. 
The advent of Tiberius Gracchus brought a new political concept 
to Rome. This was the use of the power of the comitia tributa to 
"enforce" popular will on the Senate, regardless of the senatorial 
w:i,11. This concept, in conjunction with the subsequent murder of 
Tiberius by his opponents, reveals the first resort to extralegal 
force or to political violence in the name of the Republic. These 
acts signaled the end of the sanctions on which the strength of the 
constitution had rested. Gone now was the moral restraint o;f the old 
days and in its place came the use of naked power ploys, engineered 
more often than not in terms of self-interest. Significantly, this 
new sign of political power rose in the person of the tribune who could 
use the strength and emotions of the assembly and the implied threat 
of the proletarian mob. 35 Rarely has recourse to the uneducated, 
emotional instinct of the mob produced viable political progress: 
it did not do so in Rome. 
The mill of the asserriblies ground on and the next champion to 
rise to notoriety was Tiberius' brother, Caius Gracchus, a more 
35Tuid. , P• 18. 
perceptive but no less adamant believer in the exercise of popular 
power. His burning ambition drove him to avenge his brother and to 
weaken further the inherent power of the Senate. The equites were 
disjoined from harmonious relations with the Senate by legislation 
which Caius Gracchus introduced for that special purpose. This 
legislation would join six hundred eguites. to the body of the Senate 
according to Livy, however, Plutarch said a number equal to the 
Senate {three hundred) only was planned by Gracchus. 36 Regardless 
of the numbers involved, the eguites and the proletarii were welded 
into a powerful weapon which Caius Gracchus pointed at the heart of 
the Senate. 
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Eqµj,j;es and senators faced each other in open rivalry, the first 
group willing to buy the electorate and the other forced to defend its 
position by any means. Demagogues agitated to impressive lengths and 
the power of the Senate was weakened so that never again would it 
exercise the leadership it had displayed during the period of republi-
can expansion. 37 Caius' v.Lolent end at the hands of the nabl~s, even 
though his slave wielded the blade, reveals the depth to which Roman 
politics had fallen by 121.38 
The revolution moved forward in long surges, crisis swelled to 
36Livy, Summaries, translated by Alfred c. Schlesinger {Loeb 
Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1967), LX and note 1 
(p. 71). 
37Abbott, Roman Political Institutions,. PP• 63-65. 
38sallust, Jugurtha, :xLII, 1-5, renders a strong indictment of the 
nobles. Sallust says "the nobles then abused their victory to gratify 
their passions; they put many men out of the way by the sword or by 
banishment, and thus rendered themselves for the future rather dreaded 
than powerful." He comments that "it is this spirit which has commonly 
ruined great nations, • • • '' 
periods of extreme tension followed by a time of euphoria during which 
normalcy seemed to return, then crisis shattered the calm again with a 
subsequent ebb of emotion, worn away by violence. By two generations 
after the Gracchi an extreme change had come over the nature of Roman 
politics. The ascendency of the Senate had been broken. Worse still, 
election riots were commonplace and the spilling of blood was tolerated 
as a way to solve political problems. 39 No changes appeared in the 
constitution. Still, the government no longer functioned as it had in 
the past; the levelling influence of the Senate was eroded by the 
pressures of populism. 
Some historians have expressed the nature of this struggle in 
terms of conflict between a "partyt' of senatorial (aristocratic) 
character as opposed to those who espoused democratic beliefs. Closer 
to the truth, however, is the observation that Rome, was torn by the 
clashing and rending of tightly knit power groups whose make-up often 
crossed ''partyt' lines, and whose objectives were as often less than 
honorable by the ancient norm. Sallust likens these times to tyranny, 
"For to rule one's country or subjects by force, al though you have the 
power to correct abuses, and do correct them, is nevertheless tyran-
nical; especially since all attempts at change foreshadow bloodshed, 
exil'e and other horrors of war. 114° 
Opposing the Senate were amorphous groups gathered about 
39Dickinson, Death of !. Republic, P• 21. 
40Sallust, Jugurtha, III, 2; IV, 7. Somewhat in the order of 
Cato, Sallust places much of the fault for the political situation to 
the loss of the old virtues. He says, "But in these degenerate days, 
on the contrary, who is there that does not vie with his ancestors 
in riches and extravagance rather than in uprightness and diligence?" 
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demagogues who were "popular leaders" and also found their strength 
in the ties of familia, clientela, and amicitia. These leaders were 
often of noble origin. Within these groups there was no party line, 
no planned program or organization, no continuum of loyalty; onJ.y the 
dominance of personal ambition showed througb. .There was reat:ty no 
struggle of the Senate on one hand and the people. on the other. 
Rather, there was a continual contest between individuals who were the 
focal points of diverse factions. Generally the lines were drawn 
between those who styied themsel~s optimates, or the best people, 
and those who operated from the powerbase of the tribunate and the 
comitia tributa, or the populares. 
This was the pol~tical environment into which Caius Marius 
was born and in which he developed a military position through which 
he was placed on the pathway for an aspiring politician. Marius was 
fortunate that he could make use of his military talents in this way, 
since he was born into a Roman social category for which the army was 
the only possible avenue to a political career. 
CHAPTER III 
THE RISE OF A IDMAN HERO 
Caius Marius was born under inauspicious circumstances at Cereatae 
(presently known as Casamare, or "home of Marius") , in the prefecture 
1 
of Arpinum, some sixty miles from Rome, c. 155· Two critical factors 
affecting his later career derive from the conditions under which Marius 
was born. First, his social status was such that his rise in politics 
was of consequence necessarily slow. It was not until his thirty-
eighth year that he was able to secure hi4' first significant elective 
!:ii 
office, the tribunate. 2 Further, he was beyond the normal age for 
those who sought political office for the first time and probably re-
sented this fact. 
A second factor was the nature of his birthplace. Arpinum had 
been enfranchised as recently as c. 188. The organization of the 
comitia centuria provided that the four tribes of the city of Rome 
1r>hillip A· Kildahl, Caius Marius (New York: Twayne Publishers, 
Inco, 1968) P• 26, concedes the exact date of Marius' birth is question-
able and recognizes some authorities place his birth at 1570 He 
indicates Marius' age at his election to the tribunate to be thirty 
six; Theodore Mommsen, ~ History of Rome, Vol. III (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1905), P• 452, agrees with the preceding and records 
Marius' birth as 155· 
2r1utarch, Marius in Plutarch's Lives, translated by Bernadotte 
Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 
IV, l; note 3, p. 469. This credits Marius with his thirty-eighth 
year at his election to the tribunate in 119. On this basis Marius 
was probably born in 157 • However, the date of 155 and the age of 
thirty-eight are used in this thesis. 
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(all new citizens coming to Rome were assigned to these tribes) could 
each cast a single vote. Thus a municipium such as Arpinum had little 
effect, if any, in the voting, since its voice was submerged in the 
tribal ·concensus. 3 The deliberate weakening of the rural municipal 
vote may expiain in great part Marius' continued opposition to the 
senatorial party. The slowness to enfranchise the Italians, as well 
as the restriction on their vote, provide a justification for Marius' 
open partiality toward the allies, even to the extent of arbitrarily 
(and unconstitutionally) granting to two Italian cohortes enfranchise-
ment in return for their bravery on the Raudine plain during the 
Cimbric Wars. 4 
Marius actually had two careers which almost appear to be 
separate from one another. The first, as an officer· in the military 
service, apparently began with his appointment in 134 to a minor post 
on the staff of Scipio Aemilianus. Plutarch credits Marius with the 
"protection" of Aemilianus. This relationship probably stemmed from 
the fact the Marii were enrolled as members of the Cornelian ward in 
an urban tribe after enfranchisement in 188. 5 His other career began 
in the field of Roman civil politics with his election to the tribunate 
in 119. Again, Plutarch indicates the patronage of established 
senatorial families. This time Caecilius Metellus, of the powerful 
\.. Cary, ! History £! Rome (London: Macmillan and Co Q , 1965) , 
P• 303; Kildahl, Marius, P• ~ 
4P1utarch, Marius, XXVIII, 3; Mommsen, History£!~' III, p. 462, 
5p1utarch, Marius, III, 2, places Marius under the command of 
Scipio in Nurnantia; · Kildahl, Marius, p. Z7, attribute.s membership in 
the Cornelian ward to the Marii. This places this family in tne 
"protection" of Aemelianus. 
Metelli gave Marius his first advancement in elective public service. 
Badian comments that the Metelli were always on the look-out for new 
talent to add to their coterie.6 
There has been considerable doubt concerning the true nature of 
Marius' family background. The reasonably well established associa-
tion of the Marii with influential senatorial families, such as the 
Cornelii, the Metelli, and the Herennii, 7 shows that he probably came 
from influential and prosperous municipal family stock, sufficiently 
well placed to gain even the personal recognition of P. Cornelius 
B Scipio Aemilianus, the Destroyer of Carthage. 
The Marii enjoyed the advantages of a propitious marriage into 
the family of the Gratidii, who in turn were similarly connected with 
2B 
the l'ullii, the family of Cicero. These fortunate alliances should do 
much to dispel any doubt the Marian family was other than well placed 
in the Roman society of the mid-second century. Until recently it has 
been usual for Caius Marius to be categorized as springing from a poor 
family. Mommsen, for example, says Marius was "the son of a poor day 
laboror" probably drawn from Plutarch who characterizes the parents of 
6Plutarch, Marius, IV, 2; E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, l95B), P• 195, credits the Metelli with supporting 
Scaurus, Sulla, Pompey as well as P. Rutilus Rufus and T. Didius of the 
novi homines. He sees the Metelli cultivating Marius prior to 109 for 
iiISmilitary ability and his wealth. 
7Kildahl, Marius, p. 27, attributes clientage in the relationship 
of the Marii with the Cornelii, the Metelli, and the Herennii, ap-
parently based on comment found in Plutarch; Plutarch, Marius, III, 2; 
IV, l; V, 4, support the contention regarding the patronage of these 
three families for the Marii. 
BPlutarch, Marius, III, 3. 
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Marius as "altogether obscure. 119 Regardless of these earlier views, the 
association of the Marii under the patronage of the Cornelii Scipiones 
a;nd the equally prestigious Metelli should indicate a family of sub-
stance, one worthy of such a status of clientela. 
Through these connections one can understand why Marius' education 
would have been that of the typical Roman of his station, and we may 
assume he was taught the traditional subject matter.10 This contention 
is supported by the fact Marius, in his later career, displayed the 
ability to plan and execute both complex engineering projects and 
brilliant military campaigns in the face of adversity. 
Family ties with the Scipios may be seen in Marius' appointment 
at the age of twenty-one to a cormnission in the army under Scipio 
Aemilianus, c. 134.11 Without military e4_perience Mariue could never 
have risen in politics. For young Romans of obscure origin there were 
rigid requirements for high political office. For example, they had 
to enlist and serve ten years in the army to demonstrate military 
aptitude before thinking of a political career. 
Whether a man aspired to the consulship or to high military rank, 
there was only one avenue open to him - military duty. Mar:i,.us' mili-
tary prowess must have been exemplary for his is the only case 
mentioned specifically in the sources of a man from a politically 
unknown gens being elevated to the military tribunate for his military 
9Mommsen, History 2! ~' v. III, p. 452; Plutarch, Marius, 
III, 1. 
lOKildahl, M . 30 arius, p. • 
11Ibid.; Plutarch, Marius, III, 2. 
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reputation alone.12 
Regardless of Marius' imposing record, he obtained his political 
offices only with considerable difficulty. Sometimes socially dis-
t:i,nguished eq!lites were allowed to become candidates after serving only 
five years in the anny. Later, the scion of illustrious families were 
permitted to ignore military service altogether and enter directly into 
politics. Marius was not affected by these reliefs to the rigid cursus 
honorum, and was it not that the professional officer class bec8.IJ1~ an 
accepted avenue for entry into politics, it is doubtful that Marius 
could have succeeded in politics at all.13 It is possible this 
apparent slighting of Marius' abilities was a primary factor which 
caused Marius to turn early in his career towards animosity for the 
optimates who controlled the pathway an aspiring young politician must 
tread. 
Marius chose the military tribunate for his springboard into the 
strife of Roman politics.14 This fact may reveal a sense of political 
acumen in Marius, for this position all,owed him to be absent from Rome 
during periods of political friction in the city. Specifically, the 
military tribunate of 123-122 allowed him to avoid completely any 
entanglement with the developing controversy surrounding Caius Gracchus. 
Marius was absent in the Balearic Islands under the command of Q. 
Caecilius Metellus. The task of the military tribune was such that he 
12Sallust, The ~ fil:!:!l Jugurtha, translated by J, c. Rolfe (~ 
Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 19650, LXIII, 5-6; 
Kildahl, Marius, p. 32. 
13Ibid. 
l4Sallust, Jugu.rtha, LXIII, 5. 
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was not required to make early committment to any political philosophy 
which might later prove damaging. 
During his year under the command of Caecilius Metellus ~arius won 
laurels for his bravery. Earlier, during the campaign in Numantia 
under Aemilianus, Marius had heard that commander prophesy Marius was 
destined for leadership in Rome. These two circumstances probably 
were influential in causing him to seek a career in politics, for 
immediately on his return from his duty in the Balearic Islands he 
sought the quaestorship.15 The aedileship was no longer considered 
necessary to the cursus honorum, therefore Marius' victory in the 
contest for the position as quaestor set him on his way in Roman 
politics. His success may have been due to the undesirability of the 
position for many because it was concerned primarily with military 
finance. However, it may have been simply that the college of 
quaestors was large and a good number were selected. Nonetheless, 
the military was again Marius' key to open the door of politics. 
Recent biographers have begun to pay more attention to the 
abilities Marius possessed in the field of finance. By the year 122 
Marius had proven his executive ability as an army officer and he had 
entrenched himself in politics. One is almost forced to suspect that 
financial motives urged Marius into the campaign for the quaestor-
ship.16 This office was conveniently designed for a man who was eager 
to increase his wealth. In a recent biography of Marius, Phillip 
l5Kildahl, Marius, p. 33; G. P. Baker, Sulla the Fortunate: ~ 
Great Dictator (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1967), p. 88, 
astutely cautions against losing sight of the fact that Marius sat next 
to Scipio, perhaps as important as the prophesy. 
16Kildahl, Marius, p. 34. 
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Kildahl estimates, using well documented references, that Marius had 
amassed a fortune the equivalent of one million dollars by the time he 
was twenty-eight years of age.17 The affluence of Marius' later life 
supports the idea of an early financial success. 
,' 
The family estates at Arpinum cannot account for the wealth Marius 
had accumulated, although they may have provided his initial capital. 
A reasonable explanation for his wealth comes from Marius' exposure to 
the opportunity to compete for the mineral rights, or even producing 
mines, in Spain after the end of the Numantine campaign, This sue-
cessful operation gave Rome the undisputed control of Spain. Its 
min~ral wealth was probably part of the booty of war. For a period of 
ten years, from 1.3.3 to 124, Marius had the capability to exploit his 
interests in Spain as his military duties in this period were confined 
largely to Spain and its environs.18 
Marius thus became regarded as an energetic and ambitious equite, 
the class then most hated and feared by the Metelli and the optimates 
in general. A tenuous alliance had existed between these classes until 
the time of the Gracchi. This reapprochement of the equites and 
optimates sundered through the seduction of the equ.ites by Caius 
pracchus, who offered seats in the Senate in return for their 
17Ibid. 
18Ibid., P• .35, measures Marius' success as a financier and ex-
ploiter of colonial wealth by the fact a whole mountain range, the 
Sierra Morena (~Marianus), still bears his name; that an ore of 
gold and copper was named the Massa Mariana by the Romans; and that 
a copper coin in later days was called the Aes Mariana. 
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support.19 Regardless of Marius' affluence and social position, he had 
secured commissions from the Metelli to serve ;in the Balearic Islands 
against the pirate threat. This assignment may have been given in 
view of the patronage due the Marii or, even more plausible, because 
the optimates were tcying to conciliate the equestrian order. 
Inunediately after his election as quaestor in 122, Marius re-
ceived a commission to the staff of Scipio Aemilianus in Transalpine 
Gaul. In this period the work of developing the basis for what later 
became thriving centers of conunerce, such as Narbo Martius, was 
accomplished. Marius, with his own huge capital resources may have 
been instrumental in preparing this exploitation. At any rate, he was 
thereafter graciously received by the powerful and wealthy equestrian 
families in Rome. 20 This action by the military in Gall.l. shoul.d not 
seem extraordinary, as the eguites were gradually taking control of 
Roman economic affairs and military campaigns were assuming the 
aspects of economic exploitation more than just the conquest of land 
l9Livy, Summaries, Fra,.gments !!,!!! Obseguens, translated by Alfred 
C. Schlesinger (Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 
1967), LX, indicates Caius Gracchus sponsored a law as a means of se-
ducing the eguites from hannony with the Senate; this law to join 
six hundred eguites to the body of the Senate; Mommsen, History of 
~' v. III, p. 351, says the equites and the nobility joined against 
demagogues such as Tiberius pracchus but there was such a natural 
gul.f between them that Caius Bracchus, more adroit than his brother, 
coul.d enlarge it; Badian, Clientelae, P• 195, indicates Caius Gracchus 
raised the negotiatores (eguites) to a "political eminence not 
inferior to their economic power." 
2~ommsen, History 2f. ~' v. III, P• 419-421, believed the 
senatorial class intended to scuttle colonization in Gaul as it had 
the project in Carthage during the Gracchan period but, the "Roman 
merchantile class, which was able to compete with Massilia in the 
Gallo-iBritanic traffic at Nart:>o alone, protected that settlement from 
the assaults of the optimates"; Kildahl, Marius, p. 36. 
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and people. These eg:uite successes mark the beginning of the cleavage 
which developed between Marius and the old nobility. 
Marius still had sufficient influence with the Metelli to receive 
the support of L. Caecilius Metellus Dalmiticus in the election for 
the tribunate, c. 120. 21 Why this support was given by a member of 
the old nobility to an obvious publicanus is not understandable, 
except if there was a policy for the optimates to cooperate deliber-
ately in political matters with the eqµites. This policy was 
probably motivated by economic changes in the situation of the old 
senatorial aristocracy. This appears plausible as the temporary 
collapse in the solidarity of the old governing class seems to have 
22 
come about the end of the second century BC. Sallust attributed 
this change in the fortunes of the old aristocrats to the "new 
moralitY'' which grew after the end of the Punic Wars. Greed rose 
by the side of power and affairs of state were conducted by the few 
in whose hands were the treasury and the public offices. The patri-
cian element in the Senate lost power to the ~ nobiles whose power 
and wealth grew as the Roman yeoman fast disappeared. Mommsen be-
lieved the government of the period of the "restoration," the post-
Gracchi years, was under the family-policy(factions) just as it had 
been in the worst of the patriciate. For example, four sons and two 
21i>1utarch~ Marius,. IV, 1. 
22cary, History of~' P• 242; Sallust, Jug;urtha, XL!, 1-6, 
records a collapse in the harmony of the people with the Senate when 
the peace after the Punic Wars gave an "abundance of everything 
mortals prize most highly." He further indicates the affairs at home 
and in the field were managed according to the will of a few men and 
also that greed arose by the side of power until it brought about 
conflict within the nobles themselves. 
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nephews of Quintus Metellus rose to the consulship within fifteen 
years, and of these all but one received triumphs. The passage of 
the lex Hortensia, c. 2~ is looked to by Abbott as the starting 
point for the government by the new nobilitas. This law alone so re-
stricted the power of the Senate as a body that it was forced to 
break into factions which could control the magistracies and insure 
the passage of favorable legislation. 23 
The senatorial factions may have fought with each other, but, 
if the Senate was threatened as an institution the nobles quickly re-
solved their differences. However, if the factions were not under 
direct or implied threat from the equites or the commoners, the 
optimates were content to form alliances of convenience with the 
"opposition." A single family such as the Metelli could (and did) 
base its power on coalition with equestrian elements which were just 
beginning to exhibit signs of affluence. These alignments were made 
more necessary when the laws of the Gracchi gave the eqt1ites extensive 
control of the courts, particularly in cases pertaining to provincial 
extortiono 24 Marius may have benefitted from Metelli patronage but 
it was the close association he enjoyed with the eguites which was the 
. 25 key to his political attitudes after his election to the tribunate. 
Marius' tribunate of 120-119 was disastrous for him. He supported 
legislation to democratize the voting procedures, thus cutbing the 
23sallust, Jugurtha, XLI., 1-10; Mommsen, History of~' Vo III, 
Po 37$; Abbott, Roman Political Institutions, P• 53. 
24Abbott, Roman Political Institutions, P• 97. 
25Dickinson, Death of~ Republic, p. 19. Kildahl, Marius, P• 3Bo 
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influence of the optimates. This effort quickly gained for him the 
enmity of the nob].es, including the Metelli, his fonner patrons. With 
an apparent reversal of attitude, he proposed a curb on the distribu-
tion of subsidized grain. This alienated the proletarii. an~ publicani, 
who profited from such state activities. 26 Marius was undoubtedly in-
fiuenced by his rural background which gave him an inherent dislike 
for the use of imported grain at the expense of municipia such as 
Arpinum. Z7 In Plutarch's view, Marius won himself ''an equal place in 
the esteem of both parties as a man who favored neither at the expense 
28 
of the general good." More likely, he succeeded onl.y in alienating 
both groups. Bad as this beginning might have been, it was not an 
end i'or his political career but onl.y an indication of faulty politi-
cal training and a failure to understand the maneuvering of political 
factions. 
Though Marius subsequently profited from popular discontent as an 
aid to his political campaigns' he managed for years to avoid the 
label of "deJI1ocratic"; however, at the same time, he was unable to 
secure even grudging recognition from the optimates. Perhaps his 
motivation in the corn fiasco was merely loyalty to Arpinum which, 
like many Italian municipia, suffered from the importation of corn 
from the provinces. Or, it may have been an attempt to re-establish 
ties with the Metelli, who had abandoned him because of his voting 
gambit. Significantly, he was unsuccessful for the Metelli appear to 
26P1utarch, Marius, IV, 4. 
27 Baker, Sulla, P• 89. 
2~lutarch, Marius, IV, 4. 
have remained implacable enemies thereafter. Badian views Marius' 
tribunate as a clumsy political effort which neither placated the 
Metelli nor won over the people. 29 
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Marius was defeated in his campaign for the curule aedileship in 
118, and only compounded his folly when he immediately sought the 
plebeian aedileship in the same election. He was rebuffed again --
an unprecedented double loss in Roman politics. 30 Marius seemed to 
be at the nadir of his career. Either he had overestimated his 
political strength, or he had much to learn about Roman politicso 
Either argument is sound, but the latter appears more plausible in 
view of his later polit.ical career. Using the next two years to buy 
the support of the electorate, he returned to public office as a 
praetor in 115.31 This may be regarded as a minor political miracle, 
for few Romans had gained the praetorship without first serving in 
one of the aedileships. This is even more impressive when one re-
members Marius' earlier loss of two offices in the same election. 
This peculiar political strength invoked the ire of the opposi-
tion who could only suspect Marius was guilty of bribery in connection 
with the election. 32 Brought to trial by his opponents, Marius was. able 
to secure a tie vote in the court action and consequently was granted 
29Eo Badian, "From the Gracchi to Sulla," Historia, XI, 1962, 
Pe 216. 
30Plutarch, Marius, V, 2; Kildahl, Marius, p. 40, charges Marius 
with rejection twice in the same day and being forced to "retire" 
from politics as a result for about two years to plan a method to 
erase the memory of this stunning defeat. 
31p1utarch, Marius, V, 2-3. 
32Ibid., V, 3. 
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exoneration from the charge. The tie vote occurred because part of the 
court believed that a witness for the accusers was in fact Marius' 
patron, thus not able to appear against Marius. 33 Marius' exoneration 
for his malfeasance in the campaign rendered the power of the Metelli 
ineffective in the courts as well as in the elections. This was still 
another Marian barb to tonnent his forrrer patrons. 
The one year as praetor passed without untoward incident; in fact 
it appeared Marius had learned a political lesson, for he seemed to 
placate deliberately the optimates, It was not normal for a nevus 
homo such as Marius to rise above the praetorship. Marius seemed 
ready now to strive for social acceptance by the aristocracy. That he 
deliberately dropped his feud with the Senate may be inferred from his 
receipt of the propraetorship for Further Spain in 114.34 
A new phase of Marius' career seemed to begin after his return 
from Further Spain. Before his propraetorship Marius had striven for 
political and economic gain, but now he was in a position to relax 
and enjoy a fortunate retirement. Marius chose to make use of the 
prestige of his recent assignment to secure the hand of a Julii in 
marriage.35 
Marius remained relatively inactive politically for two years 
after his return from Spain. In 110 he was wealthy, eminently 
33Ibid., V, 5. 
34Ibid., VI, l; Badian, Historia, p. 216, makes the point that 
Marius did not suffer during his praetorship as did his colleague 
P. Decius, who "got into further trouble," but was allowed to proceed 
to a proconsulate in Spaino Badian thus implies that Marius made an 
overt attempt to avoid trouble with the optimates after his close 
brush with failure in the bribery trial. 
35Plutarch, Marius, VI, 2. 
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successful, and had held the second highest office in the R.epublic, He 
was a shrewd businessman and a cunning investor; he seemed destined to 
concern himself with ma!G.ng money in the Roman economy. He travelled in 
the highest social circles - his marriage had seen to that. He was 
active, but without any apparent purpose. His political career seemed 
at an end - the Roman norm legislated against a nevus h2.!!E. reaching 
the consulship. Yet his marriage into the higher class had apparently 
rekindled his political ambition. 36 
The situation in 110 was conducive to Marius' re-entry to Roman 
politics. Constant friction between optimates and populare had flared 
into open hostility during the decade prior to 110.37 Social conflict 
served to increase the frustration and fears of the population. The 
need for a leader was made to order for an opportunist, and Marius 
seized it to his advantage, The people remembered Marius as having 
sided with them against the optimates by fostering a voting law during 
his tribunate in 119. 
A full scale war was forming in Africa and this caused Marius to 
renew his associations with the populares as a potential source of 
support. At the same time he depended on his marriage to provide 
sufficient prestige to secure a commission from his old patrons, the 
36Baker, Sulla, P• 90. 
37 Tenney Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1929), pp. 262-263; Kildahl, Marius, p. 38, states that the 
period from 140 to 120 was one of economic depression and the poverty 
in Rome caused the political parties to show concern for the populace 
because they could vote. The period lent itself to gangsterism and 
ideological warfare which in turn allowed the stronger family groups 
to increase their power. Wealth became a key to political power and 
the populace was coerced by the wealthy and the nobles for political 
ends. 
40 
Metelli, in the forces being fonned for Africa.38 This war had certain 
economic overtones and the eguites were in a position to influence de-
cisions in Marius' favor. 39 It is reasonable that these factors, in 
addition to Marius' demonstrated military capability, were responsible 
for his selection by Quintus Caecilius Metellus as a legate in his 
anny. 40 That Marius was covertly seeking to gain the consulship by 
these devices was speculative, but it does appear he harbored such 
aspirations. At least he was willing to tempt fate in this regard.41 
The road which Rome followed to the Jugurthine War shows, with 
clear perspective, the depth of the division between the optimates and 
the populares. Jugurtha, the adopted son of Masinissa and co-heir to 
the throne of Numidia, had murdered the other heirs in his thrust for 
the crown. Though his victims were under the protection of Rome, 
Jugurtha was reassured by the demonstrated cupidity of certain Roman 
factions which openly supported him. However, the scheming Jugurtha 
had miscalculated.42 This situation brought the Republic to the point 
of dilemma - could Jugurtha' s machinations be ignored or did Roman 
prestige and honor demand recrimination? · The debate roused heated 
passions and divided Rome into opposing camps. The optimates were 
38nio Cassius, Roman History, tr¥.sl:ated by Earnest Cary (Loeb 
Classical Library, London and Carribrid.ge;··Mass., 1961), XXVI, 89, 2. 
39velleius Paterculus, Compendium 2.f. Histor:y £! ~' translated 
by John Selby Watson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1894), I, xi. 
40Plutarch, Marius, VII, 1. 
4libid., VII, 1-4. 
42norus, Epitome of Roman History, translated by John Selby 
Watson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1894), III, i, 5. 
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strongly against intervention and the popul.ares were equally committed 
to action against Jugurtha and his Roman supporters. It became the 
lot of the Senate to suggest a policy of amelioration. The people had 
heretofore suspected the optimates of collusion with Jugurtha; the 
Senate's action onl,y increased the suspicion of a sellout. The people 
of Rome thus committed her to an expensive and bloody war in Africa. 43 
Roman misfortune in Africa stemmed primarily from the almost 
uncanny ability of Jugurtha to use money and its promise to bring men 
to his service. Sallust records the wily African was able to bargain 
with Aulus Posturnius Albinus, acting in place of the consul, his 
brother Spurius Albinus, and induce the Roman cormnander to move to a 
pretended retreat for hope of an "agreement." Jugurtha destroyed the 
Roman camp, under cover o;f night but only after clever ermnissaries of 
the king bad worked upon the Roman army "day and night, bribing the 
centurions and commanders of cavalry squadrons either to desert or to 
abandon their posts at a given signal."44 Jugurtha's ability to force 
this cormnander and his army to "pass under the yoke" created the 
situation which found Metellus in cormnand of the forces in Africa in 
109, with the responsibility to destroy Jugurtha after so many others 
had failed. 
Fate thus found Marius in Africa in 109 as a legate (sub-cormnand-
er) to a personal enemy who would one day swear to oppose himo 
Marius' demonstrated military capability, his close connection with 
eauites, and his great wealth undoubtedly were responsible for his 
43Henrr Smith Williams, ~ Historians History 2£ ~ World, 
Vol. V (New York: The Outlook Company, 1905), P• 384. 
44 Saj.lust, Jugg.rtha, XXXVII, 3, 9-10. 
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selection by Metellus~ a choice Metellus regretted when Marius later 
turned on him. 45 
From the outset Marius was a pillar of efficiency and decorum. 
His sights were levelled on the consulship and he did everything 
possible to appear more qualified than his commander. 46 Tireless in 
his efforts to enhance his own reputation with the soldiers; he worked 
diligently to create an impression of invincibility and incorrupta-
bility. In turn, the soldiers broadcast this message in their letters 
to Rome. 41 Meanwhile, Metellus suffered from Jugurtha' s ability to 
avoid constantly a final test in battle. The consul's capability was 
never questioned, but his failure was in the one prerequisite to 
successful command ~ that of good fortune. He had defeated Jugurtha 
twice, yet he was no nearer final victory than when he arrived in 
Africa. 48 
Marius, the astute militarist, sensed the answer. Only new 
character and efficiency could solve the army's dilemma. Marius be-
lieved implicitly he alone was capable of reorganizing the Roman 
forces to secure such improvements. ·Metellus' army had been recruited 
under an archaic system that provided men but not necessarily good 
45Kildahl, Marius, p. 49, views Marius and Metellus as being in 
a relationship of convenience. Marius was seeking to capitalize on the 
war to improve his position. Metellus accepted Marius because of his 
wealth, his equestrian influence, but primarily for his military 
ability. He says, "He (Marius) would serve as a legate or sub-
commander under a personal. enemy, a man sworn to oppose him, a man who 
had been persuaded only by political considerations to appoint him." 
46williams, Historians Histo;r:y, p~ 390. 
47Plutarch, Marius, VII, 4. 
48velleius Paterculus, Compendium, II, xi. -
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soldiers. Politicaldy appointed officers were not always motivated 
to efficient command though they were often courageous. These were 
the ideas from which Marius conceived the military system which carried 
him to almost unprecedented military heights in Rome - an army of 
professional soldiers commanded by professional officers. The restored 
aristocracy came to an end when the comitial machine developed the 
power to make generals. Caius Marius did not realize it at the time 
but his cure for Roman ills in Africa were also the seeds for the 
downfall of the Republic. 49 
Marius capitalized on two errors by Metellus, the first involved 
unusual punishment, such as flogging or live-burial, given by the 
consul to stragglers. Marius, by his example of justice tempered 
with mercy, was able to bring his commander's conduct pointedly to the 
attention of his soldiery. Marius delioerately precipitated the 
second mistake by publicly accusing a Metelli ''guest-friend" of 
treachery, thus forcing the consul to order the execution of a client 
who was later shown to be innocent. 50 The breech between Marius and 
his sponsor thus grew wider as Marius' popularity reached new heights 
within the legions by his demonstrated consistency in training and in 
disciplining his own men. 
Reconciliation of the two became impossible. Metellus' example 
served to crystalize Marius' belief that the Roman army was in dire 
49Mommsen, History of Rome, v. III, P• 462, takes a strong position 
concerning the military reorganization of Caius Marius. He says, "The 
new eagle which Caius Marius bestowed on the legions proclaimed the. 
near advent of the Emperors." He holds that the allegiance of soldier 
to commander above state is the root of the Republic's final difficulty. 
50Kildahl, Marius, P• 59; Plutarch, Marius, VIII, 2. 
need of reform. Though the Metelli had provided twelve censors and 
consuls who had enjoyed triumphs in an equal number of years, 5l 
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Marius no longer stood in awe of the vaunted family. He had success-
fully defied the family a second time without recrimination. Perhaps 
Marius sensed this was the time for bold action. Possibly his agents 
informed him the situation in Rome was propitious. ·At any rate, 
Marius announced his intention to seek the consulship and requested 
furlough for that purpose. 
Metellus used every device to dissuade Marius and agreed only 
reluctantly, some twelve days before the election, to allow the trip. 
The extent of Marius' plans for this political effort can be seen in 
the fact that he could reach Rome in only seven days, a journey that 
must have reqcired extremely close coordination by his agents. 52 
These preparations must have been m~de very carefully and secretly, 
for even Cicero was impressed by the event. 53 The success of Marius' 
scheming and his agents' planning was evident in his victory at the 
polls in lOS. The combined, .. support of the equestrians and commoners 
gave him the highest office in.the state.54 
Perhaps he was only flushed with victory, maybe Marius was 
honestly unfamiliar with senatorial protocol, or possibly it was with 
deliberate intent; but, regardless of the cause, in his first speech 
5lVelleius Paterculus, Compendium, II, xh 
5~1utarch, Marius, VIJ;I, 4. 
. 53cicero, De Divinations, translated by William Armistead Falconer 
(Loeb GlassicalLibrary, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1954), I, 
xlvii•cr 
54Cicero, ~ Officiis, translated by Walter Miller (Loeb Classical 
Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 196S), III, xx, 79. 
45 
as a consul Marius made an intemperate attack on the optimates. Though 
his support had come from sources other than the optimates, this abuse 
of consular privilege to vilify the nobles was an error which cost him 
any possible future assistance from this class.55 Henceforth, though 
he never authored a true movement for refonn, Marius was indelibly 
marked as a proletarian standard bearer. 56 
The animosity deriving from this insult probably caused the 
Senate to refuse Marius the African command, choosing rather to retain 
Metellus. Instead, Marius was prorogued as proconsul for Africa, since 
the lex Sempronia forbade tribunician veto of senatorial allocations 
for consular provinces. Even Marius cou.1,d not doubt he had been re-
buked for his intempera~e speech. 
Marius, undismayed by the action of the Senate and realizing that 
people were the ultimate power (the touch of the demagogue), secured a 
fast plebiscite to override Metellus' appointment and to gain for him-
self a firm authority in Roman affairs in Africa.57 It seems reasonable 
this plebiscite was taken by the eguites and the proletarii with full 
understanding of its nature. They were aware the powers of the Senate 
had suffered yet another dimunition. Now the optimates found the 
greatest possible threat to their position on their own doorstep ~ a 
man of ambition, a novus homo with ideas, the courage to implement them 
and the authority to enforce them. Marius, though late in life, 58 had 
55Plutarch, Marius, IX, 4. 
56Mommsen, Histo.r.z of Rome, v III, P• 462. 
57 Frank, Roman Imperialism, P• 265. 
5SPlutarch, Marius, IX, 1. 
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finally become a power in the affairs of the Republic. Marius was a 
force to be reckoned with. 
The fact that Marius would deliberately seek military service at 
his age and station indicated ambition; his use of the influence of the 
populares, even if covertly, suggests this. Certainly, his marriage 
into an optimate family provided the connection he needed to gain the 
help of some nobles to expedite his ambition. His flight from the 
anny of Metellus to seek the consulship on such short notice revealed 
confidence bred in the knowledge that well-prepared plans existed for 
just such a project. Absence from strife-torn Rome on military duty, 
to return at a time of his choosing, could only serve Marius' ambition. 
A successful command, leading to honors for combat against Rome's 
bitter enemy, Jugurtha of Numidia, could only be a rung in the ladder 
to his desire for recognition as the princeps civitatus.59 
The authority given to Marius by the plebiscite and his assign-
ment to Numidia as first consul is seen by Sallust as a turning point 
in Marius' career, Before his election he had been hostile to the 
nobles, but as soon as the people voted him the province of Numidia 
he attacked the aristocracy "persistently and boldly, assailing now 
the individuals and now the entire party." He. boasted he had wrested 
the consulship from the optimates and made other remarks "calculated 
to glorify himself and e.xasperate the nobles. 1160 
Though Marius lost no opportunity to harrass the senatorial 
59Badian, Clientelae, P• 203. 
60 Sallust, Jugurtha, IJQOCTV, 1-2. 
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class, he was too much the professional officer to lose sight of his 
primary responsibility. All this while he gave his first attention 
to preparation for the war. He asked to reinforce the legions in 
Africa, he summoned auxiliaries from foreign nations, he called out 
the bravest men from Latium and from the allies, and he persuaded 
veterans to join him though they had served their time. The Senate, 
although it was hostile to him, did not oppose any of his measures. 
The senatorial class believed the commons were not favorably inclined 
toward the hardship of military service. They calculated Marius would 
fail simply because the proletarii would fall short of his require-
61 
ments. Marius was undaunted. He preceded to reform the Roman army 
with the confidence of a man who knew his destiny. 
61Ibid. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE NEW ROMAN· ARMY 
Marius made a greater impression on the course of Roman Rep\lbli-
can history by his reforms of the a;rmy than by any of his other 
actions. Mommsen measured the effect of Marius' actions by saying: 
They now had the standing army, the soldier-class, the 
bodyguard; as in the civil constitution, so also in the mili-
tary, all tQ.e pillars of the future monarchy were already in 
existence: the monarch alone was wanting. When the twelve 
eagles circled round the Palatine h;Ul, they ushered in the· 
reign of the Kings; the new eagle wh;ich . Caius Marius bestowed 
on the legions proclaimed the near advent of the Emperors.l 
Mommsen does, however, relieve Marius of direct blame as a pretender. 
He suggests Marius' part in the ending of the "restored aristocracy" 
was merely to place the sword near the crown on the political 
h . 2 orizon. 
The Roman system for recruiting had not changed greatly since the 
days of the monarchy and the Servian Reorganization of the army. 3 
When faced with war, the Republic summoned its citizens of property 
into five classes of the comitia centuriata and subjected all except 
the poorest of its citizens {the capite censi who had less than 2 
1Theodor Mommsen, ~ History £! ~' Vol. III {New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), P• 452. 
2Ibid., PP• 412-413. 
3Sallust, ~Ji!!:. With Jugurtha, translated by J. c. Rolfe {Loeb 
Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1965), IJQPCVI, l~ 
4S 
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acres in land or 10,000 asses) to conscription for military service,4 
By the time of the Jugurthine War, the minimal financial level accept-
able for recruitment into the army had been reduced to 4,000 asses. 
Even so, there were multitudes who had fallen below this level and 
were thus exempt by law from serving the state in time of war. 
The Roman soldier was expected to supply his own equipment and to 
return home at the end of the campaign with no other payment than the 
appreciation of the Republic. Over the years the fanner-soldier had 
been subjected to one war after another. He participated in campaigns 
which now lasted longer than usual, that is, longer than from sprin~ 
planting until fall harvest. He was ruined economically by enforced 
absence from his land at critical times. As a result, he had become 
either scrubbed from the rolls of the comitia centuriata or very 
poorly motivated when required to serve in foreign campaigns.5 
Marius sensed the major weakness in the anny stemmed from its 
recruiting system. Therefore, it was logical for him to change this 
device as his first priority when he assumed command. He paid serious 
attention to training, to tactics, to structure and to improving 
weaponry, but the recruiting system was his primary area of concern. 
The Roman army which Metellus commanded in Africa during the 
Jugurthine War was little changed in structure from that of the early 
Republic. True, the Romans had developed a reputation for learning 
4Frank Frost Abbott, ~ History ~ Description of Roman 
Political Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1911), 
P• ~. 
5Guglielmo Ferrero, The Greatness and Decline of Rome, translated 
by Alfred E. Zimmern (New York: G, P. Putnam's Sons, 1910), pp. 42-43, 
64. 
quickly from their enemies. They knew that innovation in matters of 
force at arms was vital to their continued success; yet, the legions 
of the Metelli were essentially of the same design as that employed 
by their ancient predecessors. 
Originally, the Roman army was similar in nature to the Greek 
and Etruscan, employing the phala.nX formation with the soldiers armed 
with long rigid spears (hasta) and heavy shields. But this structure 
proved itself too inflexible for mountain fighting. Thus, during the 
. 
fourth century the Romans accepted the manipular formation from the 
Samnites. The legion, which originally had a strength of about 6,000 
in the early Republic, was reduced to about 4,200 by the time of the 
2nd Punic War. It was further divided into one hundred and twenty 
units, or manipuli (roughly a platoon). Each manipulus was under the 
corrunand of a single officer. In battle array the manipulus was 
separated from adjacent manipuli by a small interval to provide the 
flexibility denied by the phalanx. This also provided the capability 
of engagement by maniple as a single corrunand, if need be. Later 
the maniple was enlarged so that only sixty manip1es comprised a 
legion. Normally the legion deployed in three lines of maniples with 
a twenty maniple front. 6 
Strangeiy for such a warlike state, the development of Roman 
50 
military organization was not widely or specifically documented. This 
may have been deliberately and wisely done to avoid publicity which 
6Edwards, Appendix A in Caesar, The Gallic War, translated by 
H. J. Edwards (Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 
1952), PP• 595..:.e;oo:-
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would have given undue advantage to Rome's enemies.? 
However, during the late fourth century sh~rp distinctions between 
the orders began to break down as a result of protracted warfare and 
economic difficulties. This resulted in having all men with an income 
over four thousand asses, a bare subsistence level, included for con-
scription on the rolls of the comitia centuriata. Coincidentally, the 
8 
state also began to furnish some of the equipment as a consequence. 
Perhaps for this reason most of the weapons of the legion had become 
standardized by the time of Marius. The long spear of the phalanx 
(the hasta) had been replaced, at least in the first two lines, by the 
shorter hurling javelin, or pilum. The heavy slashing sword was dis-
carded in favor of the short thrusting sword, the gladiuso The astute 
Romans learned quickly that it did not take very much energy to fight 
with the t~rusting sword, as opposed to the longer ~lashing sword. 
They built their tactics around this fact. 9 
Roman battle tactics were disciplined, stereotyped, and almost 
automatically developed by the well trained soldier in the engagement. 
7Phillip A. Kilda.hl, Caius Marius (New York: Twayne Publishers, 
Inc., 1968), p. 66. 
8Abbott, Roman Political Institutions, PP• 53, 74-79; Mommsen, 
History of~' v. III, p. 457; Sallust, Jugurtha, LXI, 1-10, implies 
that the destruction of Carthage, presumably in the Third Punic War, 
is the dividing point between hannonious and immoderate civil relations 
between the Senate and the people of Rome. Logically, any breakdown 
in social classes takes place over long periods of time. Abbott 
stresses the effect of the Hortensian law (c. 297) in reducing the 
power of the patricians, and the importance of the first recorded 
legislative act of the comit;a tributa with plebeian participation 
(c. 357). these factors tend to reveal a growing strength of the lower 
order by the fourth century. 
9Edwards, Appendix a_, pp. 596-597; Cyril E. Robinson, A History of 
the Roman Republic (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1932), pp. 
269, note 1, 270; Mommsen, History of ~' v. III, P• 459. 
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Typically, the offensive contact began with the advance of the velites, 
lightly armed skirmishers, who screened the movement of the more 
heavily armed infantry, The Roman shock troops, its vaunted infantry, 
were armed with a heavy shield, carried one or two javelins and a 
thrusting sword, protected shoulders and chest with leather or metal 
coverings, and were made to appear taller by fixing a plume on the 
helmet. Once contact was made with the opposing force, the Roman 
infantry engaged in combat by deploying itself in three successive 
lines of troops, each with its own tactical purpose.10 
The first line of troops to be committed was the hastati, so named 
for the hasta they once carried. This line normally moved forward in 
six ranks and engaged the enemy first by the cast of the pilum, followed 
by the close, vicious action with the gladius. The following ranks of 
hastati shouted encouragement, hurled their javelins, and took. the 
place of the leading ranks as they fell. The second line, named the 
principes, although they were no longer first into battle, replaced the 
hastati as they were tired or defeated in battle. This line attacked 
and fought in much the same manner as the hastati. The third and final 
line of the legion was designated the triarii and it consisted of the 
veteran legionnaires who entered the fray after the principes had tired 
or failed to carry the battle. The lines of troops moved forward and 
to the right, step by step, as they were committed, in such a manner 
that the leading echelons could disengage, pass backward through the 
10Robinson, Roman Republic, PP• 269-270; Edwards, Appendix A_, 
PP• 598, 604. 
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following ranks and, hopefully, reform in the rear,11 These tactics 
reveal a strong reason for the Romans to avoid fighting defensively 
in the open, unless forced to do so. They preferred instead to engage 
from a prepared, fortified position to avoid the consequences of the 
extreme confusion engendered from the intricacies of the three line 
tactics. 
The cavalry of the legion supported its infantry by harrassing 
the enemy from positions on the flanks adjacent to the legiono It 
also scouted the approach to combat and performed the pursuit of 
a routed foe. In addition, the enemy had to deal with slingers armed 
with leather bands to hurl fist-sized stones into their ranks. There 
were also archers who fired arrows at random into the massed foe. The 
use of supporting troops, though considered as a part of the legion, 
was never fully exploited by Roman commanders. '!'.he use of cavalry to 
augment the infantry as an entity in its own right would wait for many 
years after Caius Marius. It was indeed the infantry which gave the 
Roman legions their v~unted and well deserved superiority.12 
Caius Marius, as a legate under the command of Quintus Caecilius 
Metellus, commanded an army which was very similar in design to its 
earlier predecessors. Certainly it gained its recruits by conscription 
11Robinson, Roman Republic, pp. 269-270; Edwards, Appendix A_, 
PP• 598, 604; Mommsen, History 2.f. Rc>Ine, v. III, PP• 457-459· 
12Mommsen, History 2f. ~' v. III, p. 457, indicates the "burgess-
cavalry4' practically ceased from service in the field, even before the 
time of Marius. It acted only as a sort of "guard of honor" in the 
Jugurthine War. 
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and in accordance with long established custom.1.3 Its source of man-
power was the five classes of the old centuriate organization. The 
proletarii, or capita censi, were below the requisite economic status 
for the fifth class, hence they were exempt by law from serving in the 
army. On occasion, it had been necessary in the past during extreme 
emergencies for the state to include the poorest of Roman citizens, 
even slaves, to insure the requisite force. For example, in 12.3 Caius 
Gracchus found it necessary to provide equipment at public cost and to 
reduce the minimum requirement so that more of the poor would be 
eligible for service in the army.14 
Nonetheless, the Roman system remained little changed and 
property was the primary qualification for conscription. Thus, the 
forces in Africa contained many men of substance whose service was 
obviously less than enthusiastic.15 Such were the soldiers who caused 
headaches for the commanders; their interests were more at home than 
in any campaign in a foreign land. 
Marius had observed these men closely in his own units and knew 
full well that it was almost impossible to train or motivate them 
adequately for extended field campaigning in foreign service. He 
sensed that the conscript, whose first interest centered on his farm 
and family in Italy, would never follow his commander with the faith 
and espirit of the professional soldier: one who would gamble his life 
l.3Sallust, Jugurtha, LXXXVI, 1-2; Plutarch, Marius in Plutarch's 
Lives, .translated by Bernadotte Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, London 
and Cambridge, Mass., 1968), IX, 1. · 
14Ferrero, Decline 2.f. ~' PP• 50, 60. 
l5Robinson, Roman Republic, P• 268. 
in return for booty and settlement in a colony at the end of his 
service. Marius knew the basic weakness which lay at the heart of 
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the Roman army was caused almost entirely by the ancient recruiting 
system.16 The paradox inherent in the system became even more obvious 
as it was shown the comitia centuriata drew most heavily upon the same 
men who had the most to contribute to Roman civil life and economy. 
Conversely, the system touched only lightly the segment of 'Roman 
society which gave the least to the economy and culture of the state 
~ the capite censi. Thus it was to the system of recruitment for 
the legions that Marius gave his first and his foremost attention. 
Marius needed assurance he would have the sort of army in Africa 
wh~ch would allow him to keep his promise that he would bring Jugurtha 
to heel where his predecessors had failed so miserably.17 To provide 
this army he.opened enlistments to volunteers regardless of their 
property status. Marius simply abandoned any economic requirements 
for the soldier. No doubt Marius was fully aware that his actions 
were unconstitutional and morally wrong. Cicero, commenting 011 this 
matter, says: 
'But stay,' someone will object, 'when the prize is 
very great, there is excuse for doing wrong. 118 
Marius was given the province of Numidia after his election to 
the consulship. This award, the result of coercion and the plebiscite 
of the commoners, infuriated the Metelli and the noble factions. 
16Ferrero, Decline of ~' PP• 73-740 
l7Plutarch, Marius, VII, 4~5; IX, 1-2. 
18cicero, De Officilis, translated by Walter Miller {Loeb Classical 
Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1968), XX, 79. 
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Sallust records that Quintus Caecilius Metellus, as he received this 
word, "was more affected by this news than was right or becoming, 
neither refraining from tears nor bridling his tong~." Sallust fur-
ther reports that the Senate did not venture to oppose Marius' plans 
because it believed the commons were not at all inclined to military 
service, thus Marius would either lose his resources for the war or 
the devotion of the people. Sallust indicates Marius deliberately 
aspired to power by his act of recruiting the capite censi, for, as he 
says, "to one who aspires to power the poorest man is the most helpful, 
since he has no regard for his property, having none, and considers 
anything honorable for which he receives pay."l9 Certainly when it 
became apparent Marius could raise his legions from the proletarii the 
· senatorial factions became aware of the true threat of this reform. 
The government had previously on occasion come close to using a 
voluntary system. Marius only closed the loop when he accepted those 
below the fifth economic class. 20 There was indeed opposition to 
Marius' action in military recruitment but it is doubtful that many 
were seriously apprehensive about this crucial deviation from 
Republican. tradition at the outset. The war with Jugurtha had not 
1 
gone well and most Romans welcomed any action which promised retief 
from an odious war. When it became obvious loyalty to the commander 
replaced loyalty to the Republic, the sincere Roman had cause to rue 
Marius' military reforms. 
The success of this new system is abundantly proven in the 
l9Sallust, Jugurtha, LXXXII, 2; LXXXIV, 3-4; LXXXVI, 3. 
20Tenney Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1929), P• 21J9. 
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fact that the state rarely ever had to fall back on conscription of 
men with property after this reform. Now Rome could go to war with 
confidence that it had an anny of men who had chosen the military as 
a way of life and who would voluntarily follow a leader through long 
campaigns away from home. No longer would human frailties such as 
nostalgia be strong factors in the morale of the legions. 
Having broken with tradition in recruitment of his army, Marius 
felt secure also to adapt weaponry and structure to satisfy the needs 
of a "new" anny. Heretofore, the legions had been encumbered with 
awkward and bulky baggage trains to carry force impedimenta and siege 
.. 
equipment. Marius improved the mobility of the legion by reducing 
thsi personal equipment allowed to the legionnaire and issuing him a 
furca, or forked stick, to which he attached his gear so that it could 
be carried on his shoulder d~ring the march. 21 Marius' troops were 
scorned as ''Marius' mules" and derisive comment was engendered by this 
innovation. Still, as was true of so many Marian military inventions, 
this device was adopted by other commanders when they understood its 
value to a legion in the field. 22 
Marius was dissatisfied with the effectiveness of Roman weaponry, 
thus he investigated both individual and supporting weapons to seek 
improvements. Formerly, the javelin, so crucial to the attack of the 
hastati, had been fashioned with extremely narrow and needle sharp 
heads which would either bend or break on contact and be rendered 
useless. To insure this was so, Marius had the pilum made with wooden 
21r©binson, Roman Republic, P• Z/l. 
22icildahl, Marius, PP• 76-77. 
pegs to fasten the head to the shaft, to replace the netal rivets 
formerly used. In this case the head would fly off or twist on the 
wooden pegs and be made unusable. 23 
At about this same time Marius seems to have caused the short, 
heavy sword to be further shortened to make it even more effective as 
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a thrusting weapon. This reduced further the space required between 
legionnaires and increased the numbers committed at a certain point. 24 
This may well be Marius' most important contribution to Roman warfare 
as it gave the Roman a tremendous advantage over his barbarian 
opponent whose longer sword demanded about four yards of front to per-
mit the slashing action his sword required. Conversely, the Roman used 
only one yard on his front to effect the thrusting motion used with 
the gladius. 25 Sword tactics were further improved by adopting the 
techniques and training methods of the gladiators whose very name was 
closely associated with the short sword. 26 
Slingers and archers continued to be an integral part of Marius' 
army, though neither he nor any other commander of the day asked much 
of the weapons or the men who used them. The bow was neither accurate 
nor effective against armored men and the slingers were not used except 
in the fashion of harrassers. Marius included these weapons in his 
new army probably more for their nuisance value than as a military 
threat. This astute commander was content to depend on the foot 
23Robinson, Roman Republic, P• 270. 
2'+ici1dahl, Marius, p. 102. 
25Robinson, Roman Republic, P• 230. 
26Mommsen, History of Rome, v. III, PP• 457-458. 
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soldier and his sharp sword to carry the fight directly into the enemy 
1 . 27 rne. 
Reformation of the recruiting system, streamlining the transport 
system and improving the javelin are 1ll1.doubtedly inventions which 
Marius' nimble mind conceived. These :refonns reveal an insight into 
the man as well as the commander. Marius must have been 1lllda1lllted by 
age-old tradition. He must have had both the courage and the initia-
tive to attack conservative tradition. His innovations displayed the 
workings of an inventive, practical and resourceful mind. This was 
precisely the type of mentality which -- in combination with an 
aggressive personality -- represented the greatest threat to the old, 
established optimates.2S Though the aristocracy probably did not 
sense the true outcome which would spring from the Marian refonnation 
of the anny, they must certainly have begllll to realize its ramifica-
tions more so every day Marius' power increased after his new army 
went into action. 
Few records exist concerning organizational improvement and 
developmental change in the Roman legions but logic supports the 
possibility that Marius innovative military mind must have dwelt in 
this area also. Just a few years after his death such a new organiza-
tion existed, and its precepts seem to have been in line with Marian 
thought. 29 Only thirty years later Caesar wrote in The Gallic~ 
of the use of the cohort which had replaced the maniple as the basic 
27 Kildahl, Marius , p. 77. 
2fL 
"-Mommsen, History of ~' v. III, PP• 458-460. 
29Robinson, Roman Republic, P• Z?O. 
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tactical unit. Kildahl speculates that the legion written about by 
Caesar, who refers often to the cohort and very little to the maniple, 
included maniples which had been divided into two bodies called cen-
turies or ordines. Based on the small amount of time elapsed from the 
Marian reorganization of the army and Caesar's expedition into Gaul, 
Kildahl postulates that the cohort, maniple and ~have their roots 
. M . I il. t f 30 in arius m i ary re arms. 
At this time Caesar's legions apparently consisted of ten cohorts 
authorized for each legion. Each cohort was divided into three 
maniples of two centuries (ordines) each. It appears that Caesar's 
legions each had 3,600 men, thus the lowest unit would have sixty 
legionnaires and its own centurion. Again, Kildahl credits Caesar 
with referring to such an established organization in his COinmen-
taries .31 It is logical to conclude that much of the development 
reflected in Caesar's legions would have occurred before he became 
their commander. Marius consistently demonstrated an inventive and 
innovative mind, closely in tune with needed improvements demanded 
by the military situation of his day. Though the record is not clear, 
it is reasonable to credit Marius with a great share in the changes 
of the legion, as it appeared in Caesarian days in contrast to the 
legion of the early Jugurthine war period. 32 
In all his endeavors Marius never conceded the possibility of 
defeat in the field, and always accepted victory as the natural state 
3°Kildahl, Marius, pp. 78-79; Edwards, Appendix A_, PP• 596-597 • 
31Kildahl, Marius, P• 79. 
32Momms~n, Histo;rx of ~' v. III, PP• 456-460. 
of things. It was with this frame of mind that Marius, after his 
election to the consulship in 107, returned to Africa with a con-
siderably larger contingent than he had been authorized,33 He 
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brought to Africa "new soldiers" who were indoctrinated with the spirit 
of his new army, to intermix with and raise the morale of the legions 
he accepted from Metelli. This situation provided Marius with an 
excellent opportunity and ample time to evaluate the performance of 
both conscript and volunteer. He found the latter more suit!ble to 
the demands of the army. Particularly for offensive campai,gns beyond 
r 
the confines of Italy. The infusion of this new energy could only 
turn the action in Africa toward a better conclusion. 
Marius entered Africa with his new troops just as an angry and 
bitt,er Metellus departed covertly for Rome, wishing thereby to avoid a 
meeting with Marius. Quintus Caecilius Metellus chose to give a 
subordinate the task of transferring the command to Marius. The fact 
that Metellus decided to slight Marius deliberately in this manner is 
indicative of the strong feeling against Marius on his part, and that 
of the optimates also. 34 The military figure has always been prone 
to seek the pomp and the ceremony of such affairs as the receipt of a 
new command. For Metellus to have deliberately avoided such a pres-
tigious affair reveals strong animosity and deliberate intent. The 
..• 
irritation of the Senate, thus all optimates as well, with \he new 
33sallust, Jugqrtha, LXXXV'I, 4-5, implies that Marius, through his 
recruitment of the capite . censi, was able to secure more volunteers 
than the state had authorized. Also, there is an implication that 
Marius may have done this deliberately to secure the broadcast base 
possible for later use. 
34Ibid,; Plutarch, Marius, X, 2. 
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consul, and their prejudice for one of their own, is amply displayed 
by the award of an impressive Roman welcome for Metellus on his return 
to Rome. 35 This ceremony had overtones of a political demonstration 
against Marius and the populares, and was probably given as much to 
spite Marius ~s to honor Metellus. 
The intent of the optimates was made crystal clear; their anti-
Marian attitude was fully demonstrated by awarding Metellus the title 
of "Numidicus. 1136 The award of a battle honor for a war not yet won 
was an immediate slap at Marius and a denial to him of such an honor if 
he won the war. Senatorial vindictiveness prevailed for Marius was 
never to be given an honorary campaign title for any of his victories. 
Marius quickly put his men to the test. He required his legions 
to attack many places at once, thereby rapidly providing the experience 
his men needed and, at the same time, keeping his enemies off balance. 
When his force was ready he attacked and captured Capsa though it was 
a considerable distance into the desert. By carrying water in cattle 
skin containers and driving cattle with his columns, Marius was able 
to place his forces before Capsa and to secure its capitulation. 
Marius' genius is shown in his ability to march his army across five 
hundred miles of Numidian desert to capture Jugurtha' s treasure base 
and powerful fortress in Mauretania. Marius revealed in this campaign 
that the successful commander has an extra ability the normal officer 
does not have - luck. Just as he might have given up in despair of 
ever forcing J"UgUrtha's fortress, a hidden entry was discovered and the 
35Sallust, Jugurtha, LX.XXVI+I, l"'.""2~. 
3~Sallust, J1:!Surtha, LXXXVI, 3-5; LXXXVIII, 2; Kildahl, Marius, 
p. 82. 
stronghold was taken by surprise. 
Marius' tactics were to capture and destroy the Numidian, for it 
was sheer folly to wear his army out in march and counter-march chasing 
an elusive wraith across the desert. Rather than seeking battle, 
Marius designed a series of ambushes and was finally able to trap 
Jugurtha and his ally, Bocchus, into a decisive battle in the desert. 
Marius had caused his legions to appear as if a demoralized unit in 
disorder on the march, a fact the Africans did not realize until they 
committed their forces to certain destruction. This decisive battle 
in the open desert ended the actual fighting. What remained to be 
done was anti-climatic. Bocchus of Mauretania was convinced resistance 
was futile and decided to negotiate. Sulla, the spokesman for the 
Romans was eventually able to convince Bocchus that his best interests 
lay in conciliating Rome by aiding in the capture of Jugurtha. 
In the same election that had carried Marius to the consulship, 
a young Roman named Sulla was elected to the post of quaestor. Lucius 
Cornelius Sulla was of noble but impoverished parentage and had a 
distinct taste for politics which Marius could never develop. At first 
the relationship between Marius and Sulia was harmonious and Marius 
entrusted the young quaestor with the recruitment and training of a 
cavalry detachment. Sulla was both ambitious and intelligent. The 
relationship with Marius provided him the opportunity to satisfy both 
his th~rst for fame and his desire for position in the state. 
Sulla was as politically polished as Marius was rough. In fact, 
Sulla robbed Marius as neatly of a complete success in Africa as Marius 
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had deliberately deprived Metellus of his.37 Sulla was able to capture 
Jugurtha by his cleverness and natural talent for deviousness. He 
caused the scene of his triumph over the African to be engraved on 
his ring, a constant reminder to Marius of Sulla's accomplishment. 
A breech developed between these two: one which never healed and 
eventually caused Rome to be torn asunder by factionalism centered on 
these two adversaries. 
Marius required about two and one half years in Africa to complete 
the task he had promised to the Romans, the return to Rome of its 
avowed enemy, Jugurtha. Though the African was not delivered to Rome 
until c. 104, Marius' authority had been extended as consul in 106 and 
he was re-elected in absentia during 105. This was a display of the 
raw power the equites and populares now held in the political arena of 
Rome. Above all, it was an indication of the confidence the commoners 
held for Marius. The nobility could no longer afford to ignore the 
potential threat which the brash commander now represented for them. 
Marius returned to Rome early in 104, with him was Jugurtha, now 
a captive in heavy fetters. The tides of fortune had turned. Now 
Marius held as high a prestige in Rome as one could hope for. Jugurtha 
was no longer the arrogant royal vi.sitor who had shamed the city by 
openly stating that the purchaser who offered the right price could 
claim the city. Instead he had fallen and was an example of pity and 
scorn, not the target of bitter resentment. Safely between the hero 
and the captive was Sulla. He was now noticed, his reputation was on 
the mend, and he was busily maneuvering his grasp for power in the 
37Plutarch, Marius, X, 2. 
politics of Rome. 
Marius received the triumph he so richly deserved but Metellus so 
bitterly resented. Jugurtha was paraded through Rome as a public 
spectacle, then put to death for his crimes against the Republic. The 
state had almost found itselt acting in the nature of a personal ven-
detta to avenge Jugurtha's insults against its honor. The war's end 
brought relief to Rome which showered its gratitude on Marius for his 
part in ending the trouble Jugurtha had caused the city. Marius was 
raised to heights of adulation by the crowd and his name sounded 
throughout the city. Though he was the recipient of the city's grati-
tude, Marius remained the focal point of the optimate's animosity. They 
steadfastly refused to honor Marius as they had acknowledged Metellus. 
The Jugurthine war at an end, Marius celebrated his victory in 
Rome in the spring of 104 with a huge triumph and the adoration of the 
tumultuous crowd. 38 No Roman doubted that Marius was the man of the 
hour. All of Rome celebrated its vengeance on the African who had 
insulted Roman honor and degraded it in the eyes of the world. Ju-
gurtha' s ec;i.rly successes in bribing Roman officials had convinced him 
the city had its price. He not only had murdered his brothers but 
savagely massacred the Italiotes of Cirta as well. Called to account 
by the Senate, more from the pressure of the popular demand for action 
than any magisterial inspiration, Jugurtha was able to escape any 
retribution through the bribing of officials such as Caius Baebius, 
the tribune. When the pressure of the populace finally brought Rome 
38Henry Smith Williams, ~Historians History of the World, 
Vol. V (New York: The Outlook Company, 1905), PP• 391-392; Sallust, 
Jugurtha, XIV, 3-4; Plutarch, Marius, XII, 2-4. 
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to censure Jugurtha and to initiate the raising of troops against 
him, the African departed Rome publicly proclaiming: "A city for sale 
and doomed to speedy destruction if it finds a purchaser. 1139 Thus it 
was primarily to avenge its sullied honor that Rome had gone to war 
with Jugurtha. 
Regardless of Roman joy and happiness in the defeat of the African 
and the redemption of their honor, there was serious concern for the 
storm brewing in Transalpina. Almost coincidentally with the victory 
in Africa, Rome received word of the defeat of generals Quintus Caepio 
and Gnaeui:; Manlius and the Roman legions in Gaul. Though Jugurtha was 
gone, Rome could not afford to relax for she faced an even greater 
threat from the Germanic peoples of the north. Even Sallust concedes 
that the Romans feared the Gauls and fought against them for life not 
glory.40 These tribes: the Cimbri, the Teutones, and the Celtic 
Tigurini, restlessly wandered in Gaul but, nonetheless, constantly on 
the verge of assaulting the pleasant lands of Italy and the Republic 
itself. 
39sallust, Jugurtha, XXI, l; XXVII, 1-3; XXIV, 2; XXX:V, 6; 
Additional concerning the hatred of the Roman populace for Jugurtha 
is drawn from Lucius Annaeus Florus, Epitome Qf History (Loeb 
Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1947), I, XXXVI, 17-lS, 
and Livy, Summaries, translated by Alfred c. Schlesinger (Loeb 
Classical Librar:y, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1967), LXV. 
40sallust, Jugurtha, CX!V, 1-4,, says "The Romans of that time and 
even down to our own day believed that all else was easy for their 
valor, but that with the Gauls they fought for life and not for glory''; 
Plutarch, Marius, XI, 9, · hints that the Roman armies by their feeble 
and ineffective resistance were actually responsible for drawing the 
barbarians toward Rome. 
CHAPTER V 
THE WAR IN THE NORTH 
It was fortunate for Rome that Marius' attention was diverted by 
events occurring in the north. The incursions of the barbarians in-
sured that domestic politics and internal civil strife must wait until 
the external threat was ended. If these troubles had not happened 
there might have been a political explosion of some sort in 105 - 104.1 
In fact, so imminent was the danger that the Senate .made no 
protest when Marius was elected consul in 104. They even suffered 
patiently through three successive elections of Marius, from 104 to 
102, though this was contrary to all Roman political tradition. 2 Fate 
had intervened to provide an outlet for the military machine which 
Marius now securely in control of. Fortunately, Marius was the 
"essential man" and his services had been chosen by Rome as the only 
answer the state could offer for the barbarian question. 
Marius had never demonstrated a high degree of political ability 
1charles Oman, Seven Roman Statesmen of the Later Republic 
(London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1941), P• 95, indicates Marius returned 
to Rome with the state at his mercy, for " ••• the Senate was cowed 
and the people would have been ready to grant him anything he asked." 
Oman postulates Marius provided for the first time " • • • the sword 
and shield for Roman democracy" which " ••• no longer had to depend 
on the stones and staves of riotous mobs." Oman speculates Marius 
may have become an interim ruler of Rome if trouble had not occurred 
in the north. 
2M. Rostovtzeff, Rome, translated by J. D. Duff (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1960-y;-p. 106. 
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in the years since his first state position as a tribune. It was 
probably fortunate for Marius also that the Republic faced a threat in 
the north. This danger possibly dimmed the indications of political 
weaknesses which Marius displayed from time to time. For example, 
Marius entered the Senate in his triumphal robes, an act prohibited 
both by law and by custom. Marius may have been carried away by the 
fervor of the crowd, possibly he was unaware of the proprieties of 
the Senate, nonetheless, this impropriety served to increase the out-
rage of the Senate. Even though the blunder was excused as simple 
rashness, it focused the hatred of the optimates, and Marius was 
marked for life. 
Before any immediate repercussion could follow his rash act, its 
magnitude was softened in the noise from the marching feet of a horde 
of barbarians who threatened Rome's very existence. Mar;i.us was called 
again by the people to take the helm and to guide the state through 
the threat of hostilities with the Cimbri and their allies.3 
Even before his final departure from Africa, Marius was aware of 
the gravity of Rome's situation. For at least a decade, Germanic 
tribes had been relentlessly moving southward, gradually increasing 
pressure on the Republic until counter measures became absolutely 
necessary. In particular, the Cimbri and the Teutones posed a severe 
threat. As early as c. 113 the Romans and their allies, the Taurisci, 
had run afoul of these tribes in the Drave River valley in present day 
Yugoslavia, where an army under G. Papirius Carbo was 
3Plutarch, Marius in Plutarch's Lives, translated by Bernadotte 
Perrin (~ Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 196S), 
IX, 1-3. 
overwhelmed.4 This exper:Lence lessened the awe in which the tribes 
had held the Roman legions and they continued, therefore, to move 
somewhat leisurely to the west and south. By c. 109 they occupied the 
valley of the Rhone River in southern Gaul. Again, a Roman army was 
dispatched to divert this human stream from Italy. This force, 
commanded by M. Junius Silanus, suffered the excruciating fate of its 
predecessor. 5 
The Tigurini, a Celtic tribe inhabiting the mountain fastnesses 
of the Alps to the north of Italy, joined the Cimbri and the Teutones 
in the Rhone valley during the year 108.6 Now Rome was thoroughly 
convinced that these tribes represented a knife at her jugular and she 
reacted with the typical Roman approach toward such a threat - she 
sent still another army. In this case, the consul for 107, L •. Cassius 
Longinus, foolishly allowed his smug Roman confidence to blind him to 
barbarian machinations. He and much of his army were killed in a 
Tigurini trap at Tolosa, the area of present-day Toulouse. To make 
matters much worse, the surviving officer, C. Popillas Laenas, sur-
rendered the legionary baggage and secured the release of the sur-
4Theodor Mommsen, The History of Rome, v. III, (New York: .Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1905), PP• 433-434; Plutarch, Marius, XVI, 5; Frank 
Frost Abbott, The. History and Description .of Roman Political Institu-
tions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1911, P• 99. 
5Mommsen, History of ~' v. III, p. 435; Plutarch, Marius, XVI, 
5; Livy, Summaries,· translated by Alfred c. Schlesinger (Loeb 
Classical Libary, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1967), LXV; Lucius 
Annaeus Florus, itome .Qf History (Loeb Classical Library, London and 
Cambridge, Mass., 1947 , I, xxxviii, 1-3· 
6Mommsen, History .Qf ~, v. III, p. 435; Abbott, Roman Political 
Institutions, P• 99. 
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vi vars by ha iring them pass under the yoke; 7 a tremendously significant 
loss of prestige and honor for the proud :Republic. 
Rome had tasted nothing but disgrace and def eat to this point in 
her running conflict with the northern tribesmen. Even though the 
barbarians inspired a great fear in the Roman populace; Plutarch likens 
the tribesmen to a force of fire against which few could stand, unless 
8 they fell as prey or booty; she chose to react with characteristic 
tenacity, thus she recruited still another army to move against the 
barbarians, hopefully to stem the now and deny it entry to Italy. 
The consul for 106, an experienced officer named Q. Servillius Caepio, 
moved northward with a strong force and enjoyed success against the 
Germans in the skinnishes of that year. Caepio' s forces were able to 
capture huge quantities of gold and silver, so desperately needed by 
the Roman treasury to defray the tremendous cost of these campaigns. 
While this booty was being transported to Massilia it disappeared and 
was never found. Rumors grew that Caepio had somehow embezzled the 
loot and, though never proven, these charges left a stigma on his name 
7Plutarch, Marius, IX, 1-9, suggests the defeats of the Roman 
armies were "inglorious" and therefore the barbarians detennined not 
to settle until they had destroyed Rone and ravaged Italy; Mommsen, 
History 2f. ~' v. III, PP• 435-436; Abbott, Roman Political Insti-
tutions, p. 99; Napoleon III, Julius Caesar, v. I (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, Publishers, 1868), pp. 252-253; Henry Smith Williams, 
~ Historians Historl 2f. the World, Vol. V (New York: The Outlook 
Company, 1905), pp~ 292-293, indicates Rome lost such prestige by 
the defeat of Longinus and the disgraceful treaty, by which the sur-
vivors withdrew under the yoke, that the Roman position in Gaul was 
shaken to the extent that peaceful communities, for example Tolosa, 
revolted and took their garrisons prisoner. 
8r1utarch, Marius, XI, 9. 
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and later helped to cost him his estate.9 
Pressure continued to grow from the activity of the tribes. 
Rome found it necessary again to send still another army to slow the 
tide. This army, under Gnaeus Mallius Maximus, the consul for 105, lO 
joined Caepio' s army in Gaul and the command was shared by order of the 
Senate between the two officers. Unfortunately, they failed to cooper-
ate because of mutual distrust and Caepio's extreme jealousy. For 
this reason the Roman forces in Gaul operated separately rather than 
as a combined force which had sufficient strength to defeat the 
Germans.11 At Arausio, presently known as Orange, in southern Gaul, 
9Guglielmo Ferrero, The Greatness and Decline of Rome, translated 
by Alfred E. Zimmern (NewYork: G. P. Putnam's SonS, 1910), p. 75; 
F1oru.s, Epitome, I, xxxviii, 4-6, verifies defeats of Silanus, Caepio, 
and Manlius; Dio Cassius, Roman History, translated by Earnest Cary 
(~ Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass. , 1961) , XXVII, 
90-91, indicates much treasure was accumulated by plundering the 
temples of the Gauls. Much of this wealth, including coinage, was 
taken by the Gauls from the temple of Delphi. However, no treasure of 
consequence reached Rome but "the soldiers themselves took most of it, 
for which a number were called to account." 
lOPhillip A. Kildahl, Caius Marius (New York: Twayne Publishers, 
Inc., 1968), P• 101, indicates Caepio, consul in 105, served with 
distinction in Spain and was granted a triumph for this. He was 
prorogued in 105 and Gnaeus Mallius Maximus was elected consul and 
given Gaul as his consular province, thus the command in Gaul was to 
be a joint command; Dio Cassius, Roman Histo:r:y, XXVII, 91, 1-3, 
indicates Mallius was the senior by such phrases as " ••• Mallius 
had sent for Servius • • • " or " • • • the Cimbri made overtures to 
Mallius, as consul • • • " He supports the idea that Caepio was pro-
rogued. There is no doubt from this source that Caepio was extremely 
jealous of Mallius. 
1~ommsen, Histo:r:y 2f. ~' v. III, PP• 436-439; Livy, Summaries, 
LXVII, states Caepio's property was confiscated, presumably for the 
defeat at Arausio and possibly for the loss of the treasure at Tolosa. 
He became the first to suffer such punishment since Tarquinus Super-
bus; Robinson, Roman Republic, pa 267; Dio Cassius, Roman History, 
XXVII, 91, says the two officers were at loggerheads~ Caepio is 
charged with interfering in negotiations between Mallius and the 
Cimbris, thereby causing the battle at Arausio. 
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the Cimbri and the Teutones attacked first the force of Caepio and 
later that of Mallius. This horrible defeat (the worst since Cannae) 
visited on the legions a humiliation from which they would not recover 
until Marius showed the way. The annhilation of Rome's latest offen-
sive thrust against the barbarians almost completely destroyed Roman 
pride and prestige as well. 
Rome was rocked to its very foundations by news of the defeat 
at Arausio. Despair replaced the remaining vestiges of Roman confi-
dence, if much was left after the defeats of Carbo, Silanius, and 
Longinus.12 To the Romans the struggle appeared lost. Every army 
sent to Gaul had been ruthlessly destroyed. Now at last the fertile 
plains of Italy and the approaches to them lay open to the Cimbri and 
their allies. 
There seem to be parallels between the Roman experience in Africa 
against Jugurtha and Rone' s efforts in the north with the Cimbri and 
the Teutones. Roman legions in both campaigns appeared to be plagued 
by the greed and jealousy of their commanders. The enemy seemed to 
gain strength as the Romans suffered defeat after defeat in Gaul, just 
as he had in the case of the war against Jugurtha. In Gaul, as in 
Africa, the deeds of Caius Marius would be the deciding element in 
favor of victory. Rome had reason to take heart in the year 104, 
however. Marius, the victor over Jugurtha, had returned as a hero and 
became the new consul at the demand of a seriously frightened populace. 
12Mommsen, History of Rome, v. III, pp. 437-438; Robinson, Roman 
Republic, P• 263; G. P. Baker, Sulla the Fortunate: ~Great 
Dictator (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1967), P• 116, says the 
aftermath of Arausio was a fear so great the name Caepio became a 
byword. 
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It was his destiny to succeed where so many others failed. Caius 
Marius had the intelligence, the military aQumen, and above all, the 
tenacity to be a winner. There was no doubt the people knew he was the 
man to save the Republic.13 
It is. axiomatic that good fortune is often worth the equivalent 
of a strong division to the commander. Even Marius might never have 
been able to turn the tide and solve Rome's dilemma in the north if 
the Cimbri had not wandered capriciously to the west and the Teutones, 
just as aimlessly, had not simply drifted about Gaul after Arausio .14 
This reprieve gave Rome a breathing spell and provided Marius the time 
he needed to prepare for the inevitable assault from the unpredictable 
barbarians. Not until the year 102 did the Cimbri and the Teutones 
unite and point themselves toward Rome. But, by this time Marius was 
prepared· and ready to cope with the threat. 
Earlier, at the time of his first consulship, Marius had left 
P. Rutilus Rufus in Italy to continue the military reforms which 
Marius himself had designed. Rutilus recruited a new army and super-
vised its training in sword drill under the discerning eyes of pro-
fessional gladiators. l5 Possibly in 107 when he buil, t his new army 
after being assigned the consular province of Numidia or perhaps in 
104, when he returned from Africa as the victor over Jugurtha, Marius 
13P1utarch, Marius, XII, 1-5; Florus , Epitome , I, xrmi, 5; 
Napoleon III, Julius Caesar, v. I, p. 252; Velleius Paterculus, 
Compendium 2£. the History of~' translated by John Selby Watson 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1894), II, XII, 4-5. 
14P1utarch, Marius, XIV, 1-3. 
1~ommsen, History 2.! Rome, v. III, pp. 459-461; Kildahl, Mari.us, 
P• 102. 
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again shortened the gladius to improve its effectiveness. This modifi-
cation also permitted more Roman troops to be in action at any point in 
the line. Capable authorities have indicated that this single innova-
tion was as important to the development of Roman military technology 
as the invention of the breechloading rifle was for modern warfare.16 
Marius' army in Africa had been a mixed force. Volunteers shared 
duties with veterans from Metellus' forces who had been recruited in 
the ancient manner through the Comitia Centuriata. Thus Marius had 
the opportunity for close range observation of the performance from 
both conscript and volunteer soldiers. He was fully aware of the more 
efficient and soldierly performance of the volunteer who fought for 
reward, not patriotism. Marius was completely dissatisfied with the 
potential of the combined force. For these reasons .Marius wanted an 
army composed entirely of volunteers for the forthcoming struggle 
in Gaul. He undoubtedly reasoned that these soldiers would serve 
cheerfully, campaign effectively, and give him their undivided loyalty. 
Such an army waited for him in Italy. It had been recruited and 
trained by Rutilius. Marius did not need to take his African veterans 
to Gaul. He simply accepted the command of any army which was eager 
to fight for Marius and for Rome.17 There were those, mostly from the 
old aristocracy, who thought Marius probably wished the first more 
than the latter. 
Romans must have seen the day Marius accepted his new command as 
16Kildahl, Marius, PP• 102-103. 
17Mommsen, History of ~' v. III, pp. 456-460; Kildahl, Marius, 
p. 103; Plutarch, Marius, XIV, 1-6; Napoleon III, Julius Caesar, 
v. I, P• 253. 
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an auspicious event. The soldiers probably sensed the excitement of 
serving under a great and fortunate commander. The populus must have 
viewed the heroic officer as their savior from the barbarian threat. 
Still, Marius could not have avoided realizing the burden he carried. 
He could, as had his predecessors, meet with disaster if he miscalcu-
lated. His men and the Roman throng regarded him as invincible, but 
fortune and the crowd are often fickle followers. Then too, Marius 
was not a favorite of the aristocratic class, which still smarted as 
a group from his insults to Metellus and to the Senate. Would factions 
of this class thwart him just when he was riding the crest of his 
popularity? 
Regardless of the animosity and ill will of the senatorial class, 
for the next five years the people faithfully re-elected Marius to the 
consulship and he repaid them with a resounding victory over the 
barbarians. Marius moved against the Germans with the complete love 
and faith of his legions and the fervent prayers of a devoted 
lB populus. 
Marius and his forces entered southern Gaul in early 104. Time 
was on the Roman side. Each day the inevitable confrontation with the 
barbarians was delayed served only to improve Marius' position as a 
commander. During the next two years he kept a watchful eye on the 
enemy and established the principles upon which were founded the 
later reputation of the Roman army: discipline, industry, military 
1~1utarch, Marius XIV, 2-3; Velleius Paterculus, CogrPendium, II, 
xii; Florus, Epitome, I, xxxvii; Dio Cassius, Roman . History, XXVII, 
1-2., 
prowess, and engineering skiu.19 
The two year interlude preceding the fateful clashes with the 
intruders gave Marius the time to complete extensive civil projects 
and to perfect his military reforms. Marius must have had many men 
skilled in civil engineering, for his legions completed roads, re-
l· 
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taining walls, bridges, irrigations systems, harbors and aquaducts as 
part of their training during the sojourn in Gaul. It is reasonable 
that these facilities were built with an eye to the commercial bene-
fits derived from expanded market areas. Marius' earlier experience 
as a publicani, an exploiter of Spanish mineral wealth, and as an 
investor gave him the eye for such evaluation of military projects, 20 
These projects undoubtedly profited the eguites and perhaps were even 
instigated by them. This is a reasonable speculation, for Marius 
shared both sympathy and a common background with the eguites. Evi-
dence of this relationship may be deduced from the construction of a 
complete harbor facility, known as the fossa Mariana, at Massilia. 21 
These works apparently had a permanance which belied their use for 
19Plutarch, Marius, XV, 1-3; Mommsen, History of ~, v. III, 
pp. 443-445; Abbott, Roman Political Institutions, P• 100; Edwards,. 
Appendix A in Caesar, The Gallic War, translated by H. J. Edwards 
(Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1952). 
2°Kildahl, Marius, pp. 104, 106-107; Plutarch, Marius, XIV, 8, 
indicates Marius had his men build a great canal because "the men had 
nothing else to do." This canal provided easier access to the river 
mouth and to unloading facilities for the ships. The ancient and less 
modern writers seem to have failed to grasp an understanding of Marius' 
economic activities. More modern biographers stress his endeavors 
as a publicanus, as an exploiter of mineral wealth, and as a commercial 
investor. This thesis chooses to speculate on Marius' commercial link 
with the trader class and to postulate that his port program at Mas-
silia was for commercial development as much as for military logistics. 
21plutarch, Marius, XV, 1-3; Kildahl, Marius, pp. 106-107. 
· limited military purposes, in fact, Marius' name is still displayed 
on maps to identify channel-work in the Rhone estuary. 
Marius made significant alt~rations in the format of the Roman 
army during this interim -- changes so fundamental that the influence 
of the optimates, who had heretofore almost controlled the nature of 
Roman militarism, was depreciated almost completely in the field of 
·1·t di t• 22 M ' d th d •t d al t nu. i ary rec ion. arius ma e e army an i s comman ers mos 
totally dependent on the services of the centurion. These officers 
of the maneuver elements of the cohortek1 were charged with greater 
responsibility and now worked more closely with their superiors. 
Marius deliberately let it be known to all through his studied 
partiality and support of the centurions that these new types of 
Roman officers had his blessing and were extensions of his personal 
authority. From this time the combat responsibilities and direct 
influence on the troops by the military tribunes and politically 
appointed legati waned, and they were relegated to staff and planning 
duties. 23 Now the professional centurion became the most effective 
combat officers of the army. There was thus less use for the scion 
of aristocracy in the new professional army. 
Marius completed the process of making the cohort the tactical 
unit to replace the maniple, which had proven too small. The maniple 
remained in the legion, each of its cohorts having three maniples of 
two centuries or ordines. He standardized weapons and armament and 
replaced a variety of items with uniform equipment furnished by the 
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2~dwards, Appendix A; Ferrero, Decline of~' pp~ 73-77; 
Mommsen, History£!~' v. III, pp. 456-461; Kildahl, Marius, P• 105. 
2\ommsen, History of Rome, v. III, pp. 456-461. 
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state. Each soldier carried the short sword and at least one javelin. 
The three lines of attack, later used by Caesar as part of his 
tactics, were stabilized and accepted as a tactical strategem by the 
army of Caius Marius. 24 Marius welded the concepts of efficient 
equipment, volunteer soldiers, sound tactical organization, and a 
professional officer corps into the best infantry units the world 
had seen by that day. 
Marius understood so completely his function as a commander that 
he instinctively sensed the emotional needs of his army as fully as 
he knew its physical needs. Morale and identification, a "sense" of 
belonging, are counterpart to discipline and effectiveness in a 
military unit. Marius introduced the eagle as the official insignia 
of the legion to provide unit identification and personal pride to 
the individual legionnaire. 25 The eagle was mounted to a standard 
carried by the primapilus, or his delegate known as the aguilifer, and 
preceded the legion on the march or into battle. Each of the legions 
was given a special name so its veterans could have a specific identi-
fication in memory of their service. Designations such as Victrix 
{victory), Augusta {Imperial), or Ferrata {Iron Legion) were the 
source of as much pride to the Roman veteran as a division designa-
tion for today's soldier. These legions gave each cohort {roughly 
equivalent to a modern battalion) the right to its own signum, or 
official standard. These were usually bronze replicas of animals 
fastened to a standard carried by an honored soldier. 
~dwards, Appendix A, 
25Mommsen, History of ~' v. III, PP• 459-460. 
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Marius' diligent activity bore fruit. In 102 his scouts reported 
from their reconaissance in Gaul that the barbarians appeared to be 
making preparations for a move into Italy. The tedium, frustration, 
and rancor from two years of patient preparation gave Marius and Rome 
a fighting force which, by all the augury at Marius' command, was 
destined to defeat the barbarians and save Rome where the others had 
failed ignominiously. Martha, Marius Syrian oracle, may well have 
be.en used by the shrewd consul for his own purposes for, she often 
foretold of Roman victories when good news was otherwise lacking. 26 
Nonetheless, Marius had in fact forged a fighting machine from the 
Roman proletarii ~ an army which would restore Rome's sagging pres-
tige in the field. 
Fortunately for Marius, and for Rome, the barbarians split into 
three columns to allow them to invade Italy by separate routes. This 
strategem was obviously designed to force a corresponding split of 
the defensive forces as well. The Teutones with their newly acquired 
allies, the Ambrones, aimed for Liguria and Etruria via the Maritime 
Alps in the northwest. Th~ Cimbri chose to drive southward through 
the present Brenner Pass to the Po valley. The Tigurini would invade 
Italy from the Julian Alps. This barbarian strategem allowed Marius 
to consider three distinct threats and to evaluate each separately. 
In this manner Marius was able carefully to select the most favorable 
26Plutarch, Marius, XVII, 1-6. 
so 
course of action,27 
Marius chose to face the Teutones and Ambrones first, since he 
believed them the greatest threat. They might, if they broke through 
into Italy, influence the Ligurians who were suspected of disloyalty, 
gain the open assistance of the slaves on the great latifundia estab-
lished in Etruria, and destroy Roman colonies or commercial facilities 
if they rampaged through southern Gaul. Marius chose, therefore, to 
keep his command in southeastern Gaul, for he deemed it imperative 
that the barbarians b~ denied entry into Liguria. Cisalpina was 
densely inhabited by loyal Italians who were less incl.ined to assist 
a foreign invader. Marius therefore elected to have Catalus engage the 
Cimbri, throw his own force against the Teutones and the Ambrones, 
and to gamble that the Tigurini could be safely avoided until either 
of the greater threats was obviated. 2S 
Marius' multi-faceted genius and his disciplined, motivated 
legions provided him the fundamental equipment needed for a very 
successful campaign. By the year 101 he had decisively defeated the 
last of the Gennan threats to Rome and blunted for some time to come 
the barbarian arrow seemingly always pointed to the heartland of Italy 
27Plutarch, Marius, XV, 4-5, does not give consideration to the 
Tigurini as a separate threat. Florus, Epitome, I, xxx:viii, 7, 
refers specifically to three detachments and III, iii, 1, relates 
the routes by which the Germans assaulted Italy in three bodies; 
Mommi:ien, History 2f ~' v. III, makes reference to only two thrusts 
against Italy, but he puts the Tigurini in the eastern Alps after the 
defeat of the Cimbri; Williams, Historians History, p. 3S5, indicates 
the Tigurini were not in the engagement against Marius and Catalus. 
2SKildahl, Marius, PP• 107-lOS. 
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and the Republic,29 The various skirmishes and the several battles are 
certainly of histori,c interest, but only the last engagement with the 
Cimbri at Campi Raudi in 101 is of significant concern to this papero 
At about the same time as Marius' defeat of the Teutones and 
Ambrones at Aquae Sextiae, word came that the forces of Catalus had 
been severely beaten by the Cimbri on the Adige River. Worse still, 
the plains north of the Po River were now in Cimbri handso Fortunately, 
the unpredictable Cimbri did not press their advantage, but chose in-
stead to luxuriate in new found comfort through the wintero Matius 
seized the advantage and moved his forces to the Raudine plain by the 
way of the capital, where he refused a triumph until he had fully 
subdued the barbarians, 30 Thus, in the spring of 101 the Romans, 
50,000 strong under the command of the consul Marius and the proconsul 
Catalus, crossed the Po to march against the Cimbri who had moved to 
the headwaters for easier crossing on the road to Rome. 31 
Marius' final victory at Campi Raudi was marred by t:he·:•::i.irtframsi- · 
gence of Catalus and his legate, Sulla, who had been in command at the 
center of the Roman thrust against the Cimbri. These officers sought 
full recognition for Catalus as the "victor" at Campi Raudi in view 
of the extremely heavy fighting endured by Catalus' legionso This move 
29Ferrero, Decline of Rome, pp. 76-77; Plutarch, Marius, XXVII, 
5-6; Mornmsen, History 2f. Rome, v .. III, P• 449. 
3oLivy, Summaries, LXV'III; Plutarch, Marius, XXIV, 1-2; Florus, 
Epitome, I, xxxviii, 13-15. 
31r,ivy, Summaries, LXVII, indicates 140,000 barbarians killed at 
Campi Raudi and 60, 000 captured there. Even allowing for panegyric 
exageration the size of the engagement was impressive; Plutarch, 
Marius; XXIV, 1-2; XXIT, 4~5, credits Marius with 32,000 troops and 
Catalus with 20,000. 
may have been dictated by the necessity for the optimates to secure 
a measure of glory to offset the opprobrium their class had suffered 
for earlier defeats as: well as for that of Catalus at the Adige. 32 
Marius would pass a share, but not all, of the victory to his 
colleague; Catalus refused to accept a half-loaf and insisted to 
his death that the full credit belonged to him. Though Marius in-
sisted Rome honor Catalus as well as himself, perhaps to appease the 
optimates or possibly because Catalus was a co-commander, it is sig-
nificant that Marius returned to Rome from the wars in 101 with two 
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more avowed enemies in the ranks of the senatorial class. It is also 
important that Marius had been forced to accept Catalus as a compro-
mise candidate for consul in 102 as a concession to the aristocracy. 
Further, Marius was facing a return to civil life. He probably feared 
the necessity of facing the public in order to gain approval of legis-
lation to make good his promises of rewards for his veterans. 33 
The senate might question Marius' intentions, the old aristocracy 
could derogate his honor, but there was no doubt in the minds of his 
soldiers about his place in their hearts. The soldiers of the legions 
went so far as to compare Marius to Dionysus, the mythical Greek God 
who had carried civilization to India, and the patron of male fertili-
ty, wine and drama. Flattery often prod~ces heady aromas and Marius 
was susceptible. He reacted to this adulation by playing the part, 
thus apparently the first Roman to claim a family connection with a 
deity; a practice which proliferated later in the last century of the 
3~1utarch, Marius, XIV, 7; XXVII, 4-6; Mommsen, History 2f ~' 
v. III, PP• 450-451 • 
.3.3Plutarch, Marius, XX.VII, 5-6; XXVIII, 1-5. 
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Republio.34 
The honor pressed on Marius for his deliverance of the Republic 
from the barbarian threat was almost unprecedented in Roman history to 
this time,. This extreme adulation might well have been responsible for 
a marked change in Marius' personality. To. all this the Senate added 
a declaration which made him the "third founder" of Rome after Romulus 
and Camillus. 35 Mommsen records the multitudes looking to Marius as 
"a third Romulus and a second Camillus."36 
It became more than a mere mortal could bear. Marius insisted 
that he drink from a sacred cup dedicated to Dionysus and his Spartan 
simplicity gave way to progressively more ostentatious behavior. His 
signet ring was now of gold rather than iron, two great houses were 
built to satisfy his new and .sumptuous .lifel"'style, and special devices 
were emblazoned on his shield to advertise his exploits. 37 
Marius' victories had been made possible by the common people 
and these victories were thus defeats of the aristocratic government 
as well as of the Cimbri and Teutones. The restored oligarchy, 
established on the downfall of Caius Gracchus twenty years earlier, 
34oman, Seven Roman Statesmen, PP• 97-99; Mommsen, History of 
Rome, v. III, PP• 455-456; Kildahl, Marius, P• 124. 
35Livy, Summaries, LXVII, indicates even the "leading men" who 
hated Marius now admitted he had preserved the state. Much of the 
recognition given by the senatorial class may be attributed to politi-
cal awareness on the part of the optimates." Plutarch, Marius, XXVII, 
5; Mommsen, History 2.f. ~' v. III, P• 455. 
3~ommsen, History of ~' v. III, P• 455. 
37Kildahl, Marius, p. 125. 
had been endured and cursed; still no avenging force had risen to 
restore the program the Gracchi had begun. It seemed that Rore ex-
pected more than being able to cultivate its fields without fear or to 
trade beyond the Alps in safety. Rome sensed that the business of the 
Gracchi was unfinished and many asked if the rough farmer from Arpinum 
was the one who would complete the building the Gracchi had started.38 
Marius entered civil life in 101 w:i,th the question unanswered. 
3\ommsen, History 2£ Rome, v~ III, PP• 450-451. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE EAGLE FALLS 
When Caius Marius returned to Rorre after the battle at Campi 
Raudi he carried more than the weight of his armor. Pressing on his 
rrd.nd were the problems of peace which followed so closely on the heels 
of the worries of war. Marius had promised his volunteers a suitable 
reward in return for their duty as soldiers in his legions. This in-
eluded more than simply their pay and a share of the wartime booty; 
Marius had pledged that these new soldiers would also receive land for 
settlement at the end of their service. This pledge was significant 
to the future of the state.1 
The yeoman of the Repu,blic had previously furnished the bulk of 
the troops for the Roman army. He saw his military service as nothing 
but a burden to be undertaken for the common good, But, it was 
otherwise for the enlisted proletarian, Not only was he dependent 
solely on his pay while in the army, but, lacking social security 
beyond the simplest dole, he would be reluctant to leave military 
service unless his civil status was provided for. Marius did not 
1Theodor Mommsen, ~ History of ~' Vol. III (New York: 
Char],es Scribner's Sons, 1905), P• 46"1. Sallust, ~![!!.With 
Jugurtha,, translated by J. C. Rolfe (~ Classical Library, London 
and Cambridge, Mass., 1965), LXXXVI, 4, sets the idea that Marius 
deliberately sought power in the state by his comment ". • • to one 
who aspires to power the poorest man is the most helpful, since he 
has no regard for property, having none, and considers anything 
honorable for which he receives pay.'' 
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realize it at the time but the abolition of the census qualification 
and the promise of land in return for service laid the foundations of 
the personally recruited professional army so characteristic of the 
late Republic. 2 
The volunteer, a concept totally new in Roman military recruitment, 
after this point looked to the commander to insure that these promises 
were kept, rather than to depend on the state, which was remote to the 
soldier. Thus, Marius' veterans became little more than a pressure 
group which demanded from him its due after peace returned to Rome. 
Caius Marius was also aware of the demands of the equites, who looked 
to improvement of their economic position because of the Roman sue-
cesses in war. Indicative of Marius' awareness of this clamor from 
the members of his own class was the construction of the fossa Mariana. 
This commercial and maritime complex at the mouth .. of the Rhone River 
was intended to extend Roman trade into Gaul when peace came. It was 
a prototype of the public works projects which the Romans would there-
after leave in the wake of conquest. 3 The fossa Mariana may be re-
garded as a trade for the support of the eguites who seemed to foster 
wars of conquest for the interests: of commercial and economic growth. 
The burden on Marius was increased by the need to insure the 
continuing allegiance of the assembly, which was the final aroiter for 
~. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1958), P• 197, indicates that Marius', in abolishing the census quali-
fication for military service, must have suspected "the significance of 
the revolutionary opportunities for personal power thus opened up to 
the military leader born without hereditary clientelae." He bases this 
on Sallust (86,3). 
3Plutarch, Marius, in Plutarch's Lives, translated by Bernadotte 
Perrin (Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1968), Il, 
3; Phillip A. Klldahl, Caius Marius (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc. , 
1968), Pe 107. . 
any program Marius introduced. Marius was obviously aware of the 
demands oi' the Italian allies. They had supported him faithfully and 
wanted enfranchisement in return.4 The populares .had given their 
political support unstintingly to Caius Marius, and they were the key 
to his military and political successes. The ''popular partY'' thus 
also had a claim on Marius, for it became his source of power as he 
demobilized his anny. 5 On the other extreme, the old aristocracy and 
the senatorial factions had regarded Marius as an antagonist since his 
attempt to "democratize" the voting laws in his first political office. 
These groups were a constant threat to any civil effort Marius de-
signed, particularly if the allies, the prol.etarii, or the veterans 
were the beneficiaries. 
It seems axiomatic from the trace of history that many commanders 
who lead well in the din of battle are often prone to . fail. miserably 
when called on to cope with the subtle complexities of peacetime poli-
tics. War calls for decisiveness in action, confidence in personal 
ability, arrogance in approach and most important to the general, the 
creation of an image -- that of a successful and fortunate officer. 
Politics, on the other hand, is inclined toward leadership attitudes 
which are often antithetical to those of the successful military com-
mander. Political leadership demands concensus more often than auto-
cratic command, compromise is more to be sought after than giving 
arbitrary decision, and bold action is often less desirable than 
sensible vacillation. 
~ommsen, History of~' v. III, PP• 468-473• 
5Ibid., PP• 464-465. 
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Marius had trouble adjusting to the requirements of the political 
environment in Rome when he returned to civilian life after the Cimbric 
War. Plutarch says "In confronting a political cr:i,sis or the tumul-
tuous throng, we are told, his ambition made him most timorous, and 
that undaunted firmness which he showed in battle forsook him when he 
faced the popular assemblies, so that he was disconcerted by the most 
ordinary praise or blame. 6 
The symbols of military leadership often become tarnished from 
the associations demanded of the military hero by the rigors of 
politics. Loyalty, the hallm~rk of the military man, often blinds the 
militarist-turned-politician to the true needs of his constituency; 
the aspirations of his close followers and confidents seem to be 
ascendant over those of the public. Marius was exposed to the 
physical and mental problems of the soldier"'1>olitician from the day 
he accepted his first consulship and the responsibility for the se-
curity of the Republic. From that day Marius felt the various pres-
sures of civil leadership, though he was away from Rome much of the 
time and forced to use agents to represent him in the city. 
Marius had several fundamental problems which strongly influenced 
his political career after 101. The most important matter to be 
considered was the settlement of his veterans. The proletarian vol-
unteers of Marius' legions were the precursors of the later imperial-
style soldier. 7 This legionnaire believed his loyalty was properly 
to his leader, not the state, and served only for the rewards of a 
6P1utarch, Marius, XXVIII, 2. 
7Badian, Clientelae, P• 197. 
successful campaign. He came from non-propertied classes which later 
would represent the real power in military affairs, now that recruit-
ment no longer was under the auspices of the comitia centuriata. 8 
Marius and his successors came to realize that the veterans and their 
source, the masses, must be placated constantly to insure continuing 
support for social and political programs. Marius had to provide lands 
for his veterans to avoid a broken pledge. 
A serious concern for Marius was the aspirations of the eguites. 
This group gave Marius the balance of power he needed to ove~come the 
opposition of the optimates. It provided the critical factor to satis-
fy his ambition for the respected position of a princeps civitatus. 9 
Thus Mariu~ was constrained to consider eg.uite demands for both econo-
mic and political favor. The equites supporte·d Marius' leadership in 
return for such political actions as that of C Servilius Glaucia, who 
restored their control of the courts w~ch Caepio had divorced from 
the equestrians about 104.10 
The allies represented a third concern for Marius once peace had 
returned to the Republic. Their demands were simple, they wanted the 
franchise. They had probably taken heart in their quest for Roman 
citizenship when Marius saw fit to give it to "as many as a thousand" 
men of Camerinum for bravery in the service of Rome.11 They naturally 
believed they deserved this consideration also. 
~ornmsen, History of ~' v. III, PP• 461-162. 
9Badian, Clientelae, P• 203. 
lOibid., P• 202. 
11plutarch, Marius, XXVIII, 2-5. 
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Marius lmew that the plebians of Rome had not varied their de-
mands since the days of the Gracchi. They wanted a liberal dole. This 
group became important to Marius for the same reason the enlisted pro-
letarian had. With the demobilization of his army in 101, Marius was 
forced to the banner of the popular party for the power base he needed 
tq retain his consulship past that year.12 
Marius was forced to look to the assistance of political agents 
to serve him in Rome as early as the time of the Jugurthine War. His 
political problems required almost constant attention after his 
retUI'I1- from Africa at the end of that war. Marius was only one man 
and the task was great enough to require more. This became the 
greatest of Marius' pol,itieal problems. He desperately needed the 
services of a competent political agent. Unfortunately, he co'1]..d not 
select qualified men fqr civil affairs with the same ease and confi-
dence he had selected capable military aides.13 Marius instinctively 
chose able military assistants, often picking oEtimates for his sub-
commanders. 
The ability to choose wisely in one's field of expertise does not 
prei;;uppose the same talent in other areas. This fact was obvious in 
105 when Marius entrusted the guidance of his political fortunes to 
L. Apuleius Saturninus.l.4 This Roman was of good praetorian family 
1~ormnsen, History of Rone, v. III, P• 464. 
I. - _......,. 
1
.\Udahl, Marius, P• 126. 
1~ormnsen, History 2! ~' v. III, P• 466; Kildahl, Marius, 
P• 107, indicates Marius and Saturninus held a similar antagonism for 
the optimates, but he also credits Saturninus with traits in cormnon 
with Sulla, such as ruthlessness, which the tribune did not reveal 
openly; Saturninus is charged with exploiting "his rapport with 
Marius." · 
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but had been removed as Quaestor Ostiensis because of inordinate rises 
in the cost of corn at that port. His reaction to this was to develop 
a strong animosity for the senatorial class, whom he believed had 
purposely acted against him. He turned to the populares as a vehicle 
for his revenge, quickly becoming a leader of this group.15 It was 
douptful that an embittered politician could ever have been the wisest 
choice for Marius' political deputy. 
Saturninus thus acted as Marius' principle political agent after 
their initial association in 105, apparently at the behest of the con-
sul who desired re-election but was necessarily absent from the city. 
It was thereafter primarily Saturninus' efforts which were responsible 
for Marius' election to successive, though unconstitutional, consul-
ships with such ease.16 Marius indeed welcomed this assistance and 
Saturninus blithely exploited his relationship to his own ends. 
Saturninus' exploitation of Marius for his personal ends may be 
considered moot by many, but Momrnsen, among others, saw Saturninus as 
"a street-demagogue, capable but recklessly violent, and filled with 
passion rather than with the aims of a statesman."17 Marius, accord-
ing to the same source, should have endeavored to "avail himself of 
the dangerous help of such associates only in moderation, and to con-
vince all and sundry that they were destined not to rule, but to serve 
h:i,m as the ruler. n18 . 
l5John Dickinson, Death of ~Republic (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1963), p. 56; Momrnsen, History Qf ~' p. 466. 
16Kildahl, Marius, P• 107. 
l7Momrnsen, History£!~' v. III, P• 4720 
18Tuid .. , PP• 472-473• 
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Saturninus secured legislation during 103 to provide some African 
land to fulfill Marius' promise to his Jugurthine War veterans. This 
action, Marius had determined, was vital to any extension of his 
career. It would serve to attract volunteers to his legions and 
followers for his political programs as well. This legislation un-
doubtedly made it easier for Saturninus to secure re-election for 
Marius in 103 and 102, though the consul could not campaign actively 
in his own interest. 
Unexpectedly, however, opposition did develop in 102 and Marius 
was required to return briefly to Rone as a result. The lull in 
operations in Gaul, partly due to Marius' desire to improve the caliber 
of his legions before seeking a showdown and partly to the vacillation 
of the Gallic barbarians who wandered aimlessly, gave the optimates 
an opportunity to reassert a strong political opposition. With some 
of the fear of the barbarians abating through military inactivity, the 
senatorial order had been able to do some extensive retrenching in 
Rome~ Marius was forced to action. Not only was his consulship ex-
piring but his colleague had passed away during this term of office. 
The fact that Marius would leave his army in conunand of a legate, 
Manius Aquillius, to come to R.orre was an indication of his concern in 
this election and for the optimate resurgence.19 
Marius agreed to throw his support to the candidacy of Q. 
Lutatius Catalus who had been previously rejected three times for the 
h . 20 consuls ip. Catalus, according to Plutarch, was a man who "was 
l9Plutarch, Marius, XIV, 7-8; Kildahl, Marius, p. 107. 
20Ibid. 
21 
esteemed, by the nobility and not disliked by the common people." 
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Marius may have supported Catalus for reasons of a distant relationship 
through marriage but this seems a tenuous reason under the circum-
stances. Plutarch implies that Marius' gesture of support for Catalus 
was an attempt to conciliate the optimates which appears a better 
reason. Badian astutely comments in this regard that Marius was aiming 
for a distinguished clientela and raised Catalus to an "unhoped-for 
consulship" and shared his Cirnbric triumph with him, but to no avail. 
Catalus would not acknowledge indebtedness to the novus h.2!!!.2.' and 
Marius attempted rapprochment with the nobiles foundered on this facte 22 
This compromise did reveal, however, a strong desire on Marius' part 
to retain the military authority in Gaul in his hands, 
Though the senatorial political factions had suffered severely 
because of optimate failures in the field against the Africans and the 
barbarians, it was a mistake to scorn them in 102. It was obvious that 
the aristocratic leadership had been affected by the corruption and 
incompetency of its recent candidates. Nonetheless, it was still only 
a partial eclipse of the optimates that had restored populare prestige 
in Roman politics. This fact becomes obvious in view of the necessity 
for Marius, though his popularity had eroded only slightly in the long 
delay in reckoning with the barbarians, to accept Catalus as his 
colleague in compromise with the optimates. 
The conclusion of the Cimbric War placed Marius in a position that 
was enviable but yet unenvied at the same time. He was regarded as one 
21plutarch, Marius, XIV, 7. 
22:E:e Badian, "From the Gracchi to Sulla," Historia, XI, 1962, 
p. 221,. 
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of Rome's greatest heroes, he was beloved by citizen and legionnaire 
alike, and he was adored by the Romans in a manner usually reserved 
for the gods. He seemed destined for such adulation that retirement 
at this point would have seen him more favorably enshrined in the 
annals of Rome. Unfortunately, his forthright nature and his personal 
inclination. for the position of leader, in conjunction with a sense of 
responsibility to his veterans, led to a very different future for 
Marius. He chose instead to accept the responsibility for initiating 
political programs to implement his promises to the veterans. This 
created civil problems which eventually eclipsed his military reputa-
tion. 23 
Marius' personal attitude toward civil law and :Roman politics is 
best revealed in a quote attributed to him as the "articifer of the 
age which followed the Gracchi. 1124 Marius had found it expedient for 
military reasons to provide illegally the franchise to two cohortes 
of Italian allies after the battle of Campi Raudi. 25 When asked about 
this civil violation, Marius replied; "Inter !!:!!!! silent leges,'' thus 
indicating that when fighting begins the law is silent. 26 
The political thought of the period had become colored by events 
and circumstances of Roman life. Marius entered the civil arena at 
a time when the mores maiorum had been almost surgically incised from 
Roman politics by the cutting edges of war, inflation, and the influx 
23Plutarch, Marius, XXXVIII, 2-5 • 
24stewart Perowne, Death 2.f the Roman Republic (New York: Double-
day and Company, 196S), p. SO. 
2\ommsen, History of ~' v. III, p. 462. 
26 Perowne, Roman Republic, p. SO. 
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of enervating eastern moralities. The exposure to African intrigue, 
exemplified by Jugurtha, heightened the struggle of the optimates and 
eguites for control over the judiciary and foreign policy. This fric-
tion, combined with the traditional animosity of the optimate and 
populare, resulted in such tendentiousness that the attitude of the 
period could well be expressed - "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." 
Marius discharged his anny from state service and entered 
essentially on the course established by Caius Gracchus for gaining 
supremacy in the state by controlling its constitutional magistracies. 27 
Without his veterans at his back, Marius found it necessary to look to 
that amorphous group often called the popular party. Though his allies 
came from the leaders of this amalgam of proletarian, equestrian, and 
Italian groups, the victorious general did not possess the means or the 
temperament for the command of the streets. Marius, rejected through-
out his career by the aristocracy, saw his vindication in a struggle 
between optimate and papulare, the latter victoriously carrying his 
colors. Marius' followers gave the outward appearance of a factio, but 
this was only a facade for a loose confederation of dissidents and 
demagogues. 
Sallust recounts of Marius starting to build his political organi-
zation at least as early as the first open break with Metellus in 
Africa. Marius solicited support from the legions of Metellus, the 
eguites Romani under Metellus and in the trading class of Africa, the 
plebeians Romani, and even from Gauda who was a Numidian pretender and 
27Mommsen, History of Rome, P• 464. 
of the family of Masinissa.28 Badian shows the plebeians and the 
eguites uniting against the senatorial governmental party under the 
engineering of Marius' lieutenant, Saturninus, in the trials of Caepio 
and Ma1lius for the shame of Arausio. Marius by his relationship with 
Saturninus received titular leadership of this alliance and added by 
his own lustre the support of the Italian allies. Though Marius picked 
up the support of some senatorial and aristocratic families, agrestes, 
and new citizens, there were few established family names to lend the 
aura of stability and respect which a faction needed for success in 
Rome. 29 Significantly, though there was a long list of Marian sup-
porters, the veterans were the decisive element in the mix. 30 Saturni-
nus depended mostly on this group for voting power in the comitia 
tributa. 31 Marius and his lieutenants, it seems, looked to Roman poli-
tics as a bi-polar contest. They did not, apparently, sense the nature 
of the factional system which gave the optimates so much continuity 
in power in a state whose system was under attack and due to change 
drastically. 
Marius was one of Rome's wealthiest citizens by c. 100 ~ so 
wealthy that Plutarch credits him with spending lavishly to buy the 
consulship for himself and for his friend, L. Valerius F1accus, against 
28 Sallust, J'!Pjurtha, LllV-LXV'. 
29Badian, Clientelae, PP• 195~203. 
30Ibid., P• 203. 
31plutarch, Marius, XXVIII, 5. 
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the candidacy of his old enemy Metellus Numidicus. 32 Marius apparently 
j,ntended to spend a year of authority without the challenge of a 
hostile colleague, particularly a hostile Metellus. He was successful 
in this but it proved later to have been a move he should have avoided. 
As Plutarch records, Marius " ••• obtained as his colleague in the 
consulship Valerius Flaccus, who was more a servant than a colleague." 
The consequence was that he came into collision with all the aristo-
crats. 33 
In the year 100, Marius was consul with a partisan colleague, 
Glaucia was praetor, and Saturninus tribune. These men actually headed 
the government, similar in many ways to the later triumvirate. 34 
Now was the time to shape any policy that Marius wished to 
establish for Rome. 35 He was at the apex of his power, he ha~ a 
patrician wife and palatial homes, he had agents to do his bid,dj,ng 
and the masses of veterans to support them, he was the richest man in 
Rome and he held almost absolute power. What did he do? He did 
nothing! He had no plan, and simply allowed his agents to continue 
to handle the affairs of state, while he suffered the twin pains of 
3~lutarch, Marius, XXX:VIII, 3-6; Kild.ahl, Marius, p. 126, makes a 
strong point of Marius' wealth. He attributes to Marius the status of 
"one of the wealthiest men, if not the wealthiest, in Rome.". Marius 
is recorded as furnishing bullion to the treasury for coinage from his 
mines in the vercellae and Spain. He received booty from his cam-
pains in excess of a million dollars, he received fortunes from his 
investments, and he owned armories at Ostia and Puteoli which produced 
swords and shields for the army. In addition to all this, he was a 
tax farmer. 
33P1utarch, Marius, XXVIII, 3-5. 
34.nadian, Clientelae, p, 203. 
35Ibid., Mommsen, History 2f ~' v. III, PP• 467-472. 
doubt and indecision. Now he could not decide whether he was for the 
nobles whom he did not love, or the people whom he almost despised. 
Marius shuttled between parties and factions, trying to placate each 
one, but he lost his honor and the respect of his fellow citizens in 
the bargain. 36 
Saturninus believed himself secure in his authority and Marius 
gave him no cause to doubt his freedom to operate. He thus proposed 
to revive the laws of Caius Gracchus to distribute subsidized grain. 
98 
The cost was reduced from about 6 asses for a modius of grain to the 
nominal charge of 5/6 of an ~.37 This caused an immediate reaction 
from the optimates who feared anything which might increase the numbers 
of the Roman proletarii. Nonetheless, Saturninus pushed this act 
through the Tribal Assembly against the wishes of the aristocracy. 
He also added to their irritation by proposing to grant free holdings 
for veterans in the upper Po valley. These lands, taken from the 
original holders, would be distributed to the veterans of the Cimbric 
Wars. 38 Jugurthine War veterans would be similarly rewarded with 
acreage in Sicily, Macedonia, and Greece. 39 Thus it grew to seem that 
Saturninus, not the generals, was re-settling the anny. 
These proposals to reward the veterans alienated the Senate. 
As Scipio had seen, the patron of half the elJl.Pire could be helpless 
in the Senate if it appears the patron sought auctoritas above that of 
36Kildahl, Marius, p, 129. 
37Mommsen, Histo;:y £!Rome, v. III, P• 470. 
38Kildahl, Marius, p. 128. 
39Badian, Clientelae, P• 203. 
the rest and desired the respect of the princeps vir.40 Glaucia 
increased the fever by displeasing the eguites in seeking to grant 
citizenship to the Italians, who then could move against publicani 
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and officials by pressing charges of extortion if they so desired. His 
plan to double the penalty under the Calpurnian law for restitution of 
property to the accuser in such actions, simply added more fuel to the 
fire.41 The plebs resented this law also since an increase of citizens 
would dilute their power in the comitia tributa and Roman politics. The 
optimates traditionally fought such legislation and did so this time 
also. 
Even though some action to pacify the Italians was truly 
necessary, it appeared the plebs and nobles would defeat the law. 
Possibly at the behest of Marius, who still harbored strong animosity 
for Metellus Numidicus, Saturninus added a provision which required 
each senator to swear support of the new laws or to pay a fine of 
twenty talents. 42 Metellus refused to take this oath and failed to 
pay the fine, hence Marius' old enemy was in a position to be forced 
into exile from the city. Plutarch indicated a strong support for 
Metellus at the time of his exile, however that worthy noble "woulq 
not allow a faction to be raised on his account, and departed from the 
city, following the dictates of p:rudence.1143 The interdiction of 
Metellus from fire, water, and shelter brought the animosities of the 
4oibid., P• 204. 
4~ildahl, Marius, p. 128. 
42Ibid. 
43Plutarch, Marius, XXIX, 5.-6 • 
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senatorial factions toward Marius to unprecedented pulsation. 
Saturninus went too far. Openly revealing his own objectives, 
he assumed authority traditionally reserved only for dictators. He 
ruled without recourse to the Senate, patronized foreigners, discrimina-
ted against citizens and accepted the salutations of those who called 
him "king". Under his leadership government in Rome degenerated into 
mob rule and there was evidence the optimates and the eguites were 
reconciling against Marius.44 Marius' deputies established convincing 
evidence that he was guilty of vacillation, that he did not govern, 
and that he did not direct those who governed in his place. 
The assassination of Caius Memmius, Glaucia's opponent for the 
consulship for the year 99, was the final act which brought the two 
Marian agents to their end. This act also revealed Marius' political 
helplessness to the world. Evidence against Saturninus and Glaucia 
regarding the murder of Memmius must have been incontrovertible for the 
Senate immediately placed the onus for action on Marius by declaring 
the senatus consultum ultimum against Saturninus. The Senate tried 
to rouse the consul to action, even to the extent of visiting his home 
to incite him to action, but he only vacillated,45 It was not until 
Marius realized that the senatorial factions and the equestrians were 
combining to give strength to this frustration that M~rius deigned to 
act. Marius belatedly asserted his consular authority by leading some 
of his soldiers to the forum, forcing the insurgents to take refuge 
44G. P. Baker, Sulla the Fortunate: The Great Dictator {New York: 
Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1967), P• 143; Lucius Annaeus Florus, Epitome 
£!. Roman Histori9 translated by John Selby Watson (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1 4), II, iv, 1-6. 
45Plutarch, Marius, XXX, 2-3· 
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on the Capitol. There they were forced to surrender when the water 
conduits were closed to them. Marius was unable to keep his guarantee 
that the dissidents were safe on the "public faith". He watched 
helplessly as the mob destroyed his lieutenants, who were in their 
robes of office and under the consul's protection. 
Marius emerged from this affair shorn of his influence and pres-
tige. Forgotten now were his great victories and his glorious tri-
umphs. Apprehensive of defeat and further humiliation, he withdrew 
his name from the candidacy for the office of censor, his ultimate 
ambition. Thus the most prestigious office in Rome was denied to him. 
His power was gone, his words meant little, and his support became 
the kiss of political death. The crowning blow to his dignity was 
delivered by the Senate, which ignored his protests and voted to re-
call Metellus Numidicus from exile. The equites had lost confidence 
in Marius and returned to the influence of the optimates. Thus the 
Marian machine began to crumble. 
Marius, by his own admission, was now regarded as "a sword which 
rusts in time of peace." With the soldier's tendency to see simple 
solutions for complex problems, Marius believed his position could be 
restored only if he could regain the adulation of the crowd. Marius 
looked to war a~ the only vehicle by which he could gain his lost 
prestige. He had vowed to make fitting sacrifices to the mother 
goddess Cybele, and now seized on this vow as an excuse to absent 
himself from RDme. To avoid the humiliation of watching the restora-
tion of Metellus to his former position in Rome, Marius went eastward. 
There he hoped to foment war with Mithridates by working on hostilities 
which Saturninus had already provoked. Marius the proud hero was re-
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duced to paltry, beggarly machinations to restore the honor he had 
lost through his own political ineptitude. Marius would trigger a war 
for his country if it could be the means to restore his position in 
Rome. 46 How far the eagle had fallen in just two short years! 
Though Marius lingered for fifteen tortuous years past his 
zenith, the victory and triumph over the Cimbris, he was quickly put 
"out to pasture" by his contemporaries as too old and too undependable 
to serve the state. He saw adulation turn to hatred, public acclaim 
change into invective, gratitude replaced by ingratitude, and shame 
grow in place of honor. The causes for this tremendous change in 
Marius' public stature must be looked for in the errors he committed 
in the field of politics not in his career as a Roman general. 
46 . . Plutarch, Marius, XXXI, 1-3. 
·CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Marius may or may not have had a political philosophy. It is 
extremely difficult to label him "democrat" simply because he depended 
on a close association with the populace for his political strength. 
Marius was not included with those who played the old aristocrat's 
game - he had offended them much too often for that. Marius did not 
seem to have been a part of a senatorial faction since his divorce 
from the Metelli in 107. It is not apparent that his loyalties were 
consistently with the eguites, though he cla~sed himself with them. 
Marius raison d'etre seems best described by Badian, who says: 
The aims of Marius - like those of Pompey after 
him - were more limited: the saviour of his country 
wanted to be princeps civitatis, accepted by the nobility 
~s an equ.al and surpassing them in auctoritas.l 
Marius failed to understand the workings of the political system 
in Rome and the maelstrom of Roman civil life. The astute rrrl,litary 
hero, the genius who designed the structure which later lifted Caesar 
to the dictatorship, was actually inadequate when he had to fight 
his battles in the environment of the assembly and the Senate rather 
~. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
195B), P• 203. 
10'3 
104 
than at the helm of his legions.2 
Marius did not establish a political policy that was either 
.definite or consistent. He trusted agents to fonnulate his programs 
and he was betrayed. Marius had returned from the wars to a state 
that was in political fennent. The situation in Rome was complex and 
demanded the close attention of it~ leaders. 3 Marius had possessed 
the igiperiwn consul.are continuously since 104. However, due to the 
military situation, Marius was understandably remote from the political 
scene. It was necessary that he depend on a political agent ~d he 
selected Apulius Saturninus, who had Marius' complete trust at the 
outset. Satuminus, in tum, had secured the services of Servilius 
2Theodor Mornrnsen, l'1:!!, History 2£. ~' Vol. III {New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), PP• 474-479, indicates his opinion 
of Marius' political ability in referring to the matter of the oath 
which caused Metellus' banishment; "The consequences of this be-
havior _... stupid beyond parallel ~ on the part of the celebrated 
general soon developed themselves." The "behavior" referred to was 
that of Marius' continued ambiguity in his political attitude; 
Guglielmo Ferrero, ~Greatness and Decline of~' translated by 
Alfred E. Zirnrnem {New York: G. p. Putnam's Sons, 1910), PP• 86-$7, 
records Marius as typical of the blunt militarist who fails the 
subtleties of politics; Plutarch, Marius in Plutarch's Lives, trans-
lated by Bernadotte Perrin {~ Classical Library, London and 
Cambridge, Mass., 1968), :XXVIII, 2, apparently did not have a high 
regard for Marius' political abilities. Among other comments, he 
said " • • • since he wished to be a compliant man of the people when 
he was naturally at farthest remove from this." · Plutarch also indi-
cated Marius undaunted firmness, so well displayed in battle, forsook 
him in the popular assemblies. 
\ornrnsen, History 91. ~' v. III, p. 462, said of the period: 
"It was a sad and troubled time. Men had peace, but they were not 
glad of having it; the state of things was not now such as it had 
formerly been after the first mighty onset of the men of the north on 
Rome, when as soon as the crisis was over, all energies were roused 
anew • • • " Mornrnsen believed the times demanded a strong and capable 
leader in Rome, 
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Glaucia and these two established Marius' public program for him.4 
As Kildahl points out, not until almost a year after his returo from 
the Cimbric War did Marius realize his lieutenants were marplots. 
Marius was no match for demagogues, scheming eguites, dissident 
nobiles, and grasping proles. Though consul for the sixth time in 
100, an unprecedented thing in Rome, he was no statesman. His politi-
cal abilities were certainly limited and it seems he was "used" by 
those who would prostitute his image to their own designs. 5 Mommsen 
credits Saturninus' undiminished hatred for the optimates after his 
expulsion as quaestor and his willingness to "descend into the street 
and to refute his antagonists with blows instead of words" as the 
infiuences which took him beyond Marius' political objectives. Badian 
infers that Saturninus' proposals went well beyond providing for the 
veterans and may have deliberately put him in a position where he, 
Saturninus, was settling the ~oldiers, not the general. 6 
Strangely, though Marius was no politician, it was he whq 
moulded the course of Roman politics for the balance of his century. 
Marius bull t the anny upon whose shields the empire would rise. It 
was this military reorganization which frightened the optimates. At 
the same time it angered them to see their control of military policy 
dissipate. 
At the time of his sixth consulship Marius probably wished to 
4Phil).ip A. Kildahl, Caius Marius (New York: Twayne Publishers, 
Inc., 1968), p. 126. 
5stewart Perowne, Death .Q! ~ Roman Republic (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1968), p. SO. 
~ommsen, History of ~' v. III, p. 467; E. Badian, Clientelae, 
pp. 204-205. 
establish himself in a lavish villa and play the part of the "elder 
statesman." His agents were to perfonn all the irksome and tedious 
tasks he did not wish for himself.7 Perhaps, if he had selected his 
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political agents with more care and solicitude for the welfare of the 
state, he might have been more successful. Unfortunately, the habit 
of meticulous attention to detail, so typical of his military cam-
paigns, was no longer his practice. He ignored his responsibilities 
and his agents failed completely to act in either his best interest 
B 
or that of the state. 
Marius failed in the political arena because of his inability to 
be as decisive there as he had been in the army. He never positively 
identified himself with any political philosophy. He chose to stand 
aloof from politics, hence his followers and his antagonists alike 
could only assume his position and guess at his orientation. Metellus 
Numidicus, a sworn enemy left no doubt that he was of the senatorial 
party. Saturninus and Glaucia were easily identified with the 
populares and were recognized as anti-aristocratic, in the image of the 
Gracchi. Marius, however, never really chose to announce his political 
beliefs. 
Caius Marius !ailed to learn the basic lesson that consistency 
is as vital to an effective public official as compromise is to the 
successful politician. From his first office, the tribunate in 119, 
to his consulship prior to his self-imposed exile in 99, Marius was 
7Kildahl, Marius, P• 12'7 • 
~ommsen, History 2.f ~' v. III, P• 474; Kildahl, Marius, 
P• 126. 
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inconsistent and, worse still, vacillating in his public program.9 
Significantly, this inconsistency ultimately was directly responsible 
for the retiniting of the optiniate and equite. classes against Marius. 
It wa~ this coalition which sealed his political doom because it 
removed the factor which had always acted as a "balance of power'' for 
th M . . 10 e ari.an grouping. 
Marius greatest failure was his inability to understand the 
nature of Roman factional politics. Marius seemed to view Rome's. 
politics in the nature of a "two partY'' system (the optimates opposed 
to the populares). This was a situation which did not exist in 
reality. Rome was govemed in this period by a Senate which responded 
to the proding of various political factions whose power waxed and 
waned as the fortunes of the patronus prospered or declined. The 
history of the Metelli reveals the resilience of this faction, par-
ticularly by the resurgence of Nwnidicus coincidental to the fall of 
Marius from power. This and the other similar factions in Rome show 
the efficacy of this system which cut across class, economic, and 
political lines• 
The inclusion Qf a broad spectrum into such political, groupings 
~During his tenure as a tribune Marius alienated the aristocracy 
by introducing a law conceming the mode of voting which lessened the 
power of the nobles; in the same tribunate he opposed the passage of 
a law to liberalize the distribution of grain and this offended the 
proletarians. Plutarch believed Marius thus won "an equal place in 
the esteem of both parties" (Plutarch, Marius, IV, 3.), Marius 
wobbled around a desire to placate the optimates, shown by his willing-
ness to accept Catalus as a compromise candidate for co-consul. 
Nonetheless, in his sixth consulship he tumed his agents loose with a 
free hand against the optimates, and then tumed on his agents under 
pressure from the Senate and the eguites (Plutarch Marius, XXX.). 
1~onunsen, Histo:g of ~' v. III, P• 473. 
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gave them vibrancy in leadership and wide option for action. This 
almost insured political strength in a continuum. Significantly, if 
a faction failed by reason of the inadequacies of the patronus, there 
was always the possibility of a new personality who could rise to 
leadership on his own patrocinium. Marius failed to accept this con-
cept and chose rather to build a machine based on the physical threat 
of his veterans, the implied threat of the masses, and the economic 
threat of the eguites, all wielded at the direction of radical 
demagogues. Nonetheless, when the die was cast, Marius found himself 
too imbued with the old Roman virtues to allow the state to fall 
he chose the ruination of his own political ambitions instead. 
Marius' political strength faded rapidly when his coalition 
disintegrated over the issue of Saturninus.11 Marius' failure to 
reconcile himself with the Senate and to include the senatorial class 
in his political plans caused him to accept political assistants with 
an anti-senatorial bias. His failure to placate the Metelli, to 
seek the support of their class, and to realize the Senate was still 
vital in Roman political matters caused Marius to go too far - and 
to fall just as far. 
11Mommsen, History of ~' v. III, P• 477. In referring to the 
aftermath of the assassination of Saturninus, Mommsen says "A more 
pitiful position can hardly be conceived than that occupied by the 
hero of Aquae and Vercellae after such a disast~r - all the more 
pitiful, because people could not but compare it with the lustre 
which only a few months before surrounded the same man." 
- ' 
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